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The World War I Battle of the Somme began on 1 July and ended on 18 November 1916. It's estimated that as many as 1.12 million men were killed during that five month long battle. When the Somme's casualty list is coupled with the numbers killed in the simultaneous Battle of Verdun, it's estimated that an average of more than 6,600 men were killed every day at a rate of some 277 every minute ... meaning that nearly every second, five men died.
This video represents what portions of the battlefield look like today and the film's creator has superimposed WWI reels to show viewers what it looked like 100 years ago ... it's well worth the time:
Our American Civil War and WW1 have a lot in common.
Both saw Generals use tactics that were far behind the evolution of Weaponry. In our Civil War, Generals, who went to West Point and were taught Nepoleonic Tactics, failed to realize the futility of marching large columns of men into Rifled Musket and Cannon Cannister Fire. The results were predictable.
In WW1, generals insisted on sending men "over the top", right into murderous machine gun fire and devastating artillery.
What was on the back of the medics pants at 7:30? IDK
What were the big wood hammers used for at 21:58? Probably used to drive pickets to hold the barbed wire in place. Some of the other troops were carrying wire.
What kind of big gun was the first guy carrying at 39:33?
Our American Civil War and WW1 have a lot in common.
Both saw Generals use tactics that were far behind the evolution of Weaponry. In our Civil War, Generals, who went to West Point and were taught Nepoleonic Tactics, failed to realize the futility of marching large columns of men into Rifled Musket and Cannon Cannister Fire. The results were predictable.
In WW1, generals insisted on sending men "over the top", right into murderous machine gun fire and devastating artillery.
The results were predictable.
Slaughter. Not Glory. Not Heroism.
Just slaughter.
There is an element of truth in what you say, but the generals were forced to play the hand they were dealt.
After the Allies had halted the Germans on the Marne in 1914, there was a series of attempts to avoid the "hey, diddle, diddle; straight up the middle" mentality in a series of flanking maneuvers during a period called the "Race To The Sea": the English Channel. Once the belligerents reached the sea, and with “the long grave already dug”, there were no more flanks to turn. In a strategic sense, and once there were no longer any ‘flanks to turn’ in Europe proper, the Gallipoli campaign in the Dardanelles was a ‘flanking maneuver’ conceived by Churchill. And everyone knows how that ‘flanking maneuver’ panned out for the Brits and the ANZACS. It's important to remember that the horrific casualties suffered by the Brits on the first day of the Somme were due in large part to poorly trained troops and officers ("Kitchner's Army") who tended to "herd" together rather than maintaining space and interval while advancing in short rushes: which was to become -- re-learned -- doctrine before the five month battle was over.
In many ways, as you suggested, the "Race To The Sea" during WWI resembled similar actions taken by the Union Army at the end of the Civil War as it tried to advance on Richmond in late 1864. For several months, Grant kept making attempts to flank Lee’s army. Eventually Lee’s army was stretched to the breaking point, and Grant (and Meade), with overwhelming numbers, finally were victorious at Five Forks and the Third Battle of Petersburg; which, forced Lee’s army out of its trenches: just like the overwhelming influx of additional troops, U.S. Doughboys, helped the Allies gain a numerical advantage and bust through in 1918, in France, and forced the Germans out of their trenches and into a general retreat.
Nevertheless, it would be wrong to ignore the attempts at innovation to overcome the stalemate that was emblematic of WWI trench warfare: aerial reconnaissance, the walking barrage, tanks, combined arms tactics, storm troopers, flame throwers, gas warfare, etc.
Yet, with all of the technological advances, “inside the trenches, centuries of advancement in warfare were discarded in favor of the older lessons of mélée combat”:
Quote:
"The preferred firearm of the trench fighters were the shotgun and revolver. But these were less desired than even more primitive ones, since their use would alert the enemy. In this most modern of war, soldiers quickly relearned the lesson of their medieval predecessors, arming themselves with an odd assortment of mélée weapon with which to butcher their opponents."
“Raiders sallied forth from their underground dugouts armed with various bayonets, swords, hatchets, clubs, coshes, knobkerries, truncheons, hammers, daggers, pick-axes, push-knives, staves, and steel bars. The edges of entrenching shovels were ground to razor sharpness. Trench raiding clubs were both homemade and mass produced, some of which were lead filled, had steel studs or spikes hammered into them, or had their heads wrapped in barbed wire. Men carried brass knuckles (or ‘knuckle-dusters’) and a wide array of knifes with them. Sometimes these were combined: the US army issued trench-knives fitted with metal knuckle guards and ‘skull crusher’ or ‘walnut-opener’ pommels to their infantry.
"Inside the trenches centuries of advancement in warfare was being discarded in favor of the older lessons of mélée combat.
“‘Not since the Middle Ages has a knowledge of this method of fighting been so essential as it is to-day. As the great war progresses it is becoming more and more apparent that the expertness and skill of the individual are playing an increasingly large part in the determination of the final outcome.’
“The samurai of Japan had originally developed jujutsu for use in such close combat that even hand held weapons could prove ineffective. The knights of Europe had a similar martial art in kampfringen. Both disciplines used throws, holds, and strikes to gain an advantage over a better armed or armored opponent . With the introduction of rapid firing and more accurate firearms such hand-to-hand fighting was thought to be a thing of the past, but the War had resurrected them….
“While the armies of Europe had not been prepared for the level and intensity of hand-to-hand combat, they also had not been completely caught off guard. Many of their military strategist had noted the close quarters fighting that had taken place during the Russo-Japanese War, and the importance jujutsu training amongst the Japanese troops had played. Based on this lesson the Emperor had ordered that all officers in the German army and navy have ‘acquaintance with the methods of jiu-jitsu.’
“Jujutsu was quickly abandoned, but …. soon even they couldn't ignore the simple fact that trench combat, meant close quarter combat. This in turn revealed another reality.
‘After a bayonet attack in nine cases out of ten trench or open warfare the men grapple. The man who has never been there before doesn't know what to do.’
“While at first soldiers were being armed with more and more hand-held mêlée weapons, it was soon realized that merely being properly armed was not enough to engage in hand-to-hand combat. The psychological dread of being horrendously butchered or bludgeoned in the middle of the night proved too much for most soldiers. When finally faced with such a situation for which they had received no training, ‘the soldier has almost always lost his head and confined himself with struggling uselessly, because he did not know any blows or holds which would have sufficed until someone came to the aid of one or the other of the adversaries.’
“By 1916 each of the belligerents were offering their soldiers at least some basic training in armed and unarmed close quarters combat. The Arditi, Italy's elite raiders, took the primitive nature of this new combat to heart by studying Fiore dei Liberi, a medieval master of arms.”
IB, did you watch the History Channels excellent documentary,"Apocalypse, WW1".
The conditions that the individule soldier in the trenches had to endure were abysmal. It was basically like living in an open sewer.
The Commanders were, as you say, at the mercy of the circumstances. But when the French decided to execute an entire battalion because they chose not to "go over the top" on what was nothing more than a suicide mission, you have to question the validity of asking men to die for nothing.
If you read the account of Pickett's charge in the last day of Gettysburg, you see war at it's most ugly self. Errors, caused by ignorance as much as anything, were made by Lee in thinking that his cannonade had weakened the Union line. He had no way of knowing that he was sending thousands of men into aimed Rifled Musket Fire and devastating Cannister Rounds from Union Artillery.
But regardless of the circumstance, thousands of men were killed and wounded. And as much as we try to find the glory in it all, the truth was, they were simply slaughtered.
In the movie "Gettysburg" there was a scene that was supposed to be historically correct. After the attack failed, Lee told told Pickett that he must see to his Division. Pickett replied, "General Lee, I no longer have a Division"
Picket's charge was suppose to be in connection with a rear attack from the CSA cavalry but some how a 300 Union cavalry, lead by George Custer stopped 3000
IB, did you watch the History Channels excellent documentary,"Apocalypse, WW1".
The conditions that the individule soldier in the trenches had to endure were abysmal. It was basically like living in an open sewer.
The Commanders were, as you say, at the mercy of the circumstances. But when the French decided to execute an entire battalion because they chose not to "go over the top" on what was nothing more than a suicide mission, you have to question the validity of asking men to die for nothing.
If you read the account of Pickett's charge in the last day of Gettysburg, you see war at it's most ugly self. Errors, caused by ignorance as much as anything, were made by Lee in thinking that his cannonade had weakened the Union line. He had no way of knowing that he was sending thousands of men into aimed Rifled Musket Fire and devastating Cannister Rounds from Union Artillery.
But regardless of the circumstance, thousands of men were killed and wounded. And as much as we try to find the glory in it all, the truth was, they were simply slaughtered.
In the movie "Gettysburg" there was a scene that was supposed to be historically correct. After the attack failed, Lee told told Pickett that he must see to his Division. Pickett replied, "General Lee, I no longer have a Division"
Yes, that series is quite excellent, and I own a copy of of the video series "First World War" based on Hew Strachan's book. Both series are great.
Regarding the mutiny, there's another movie called Paths of Glory. It's a 1957 anti-war movie directed by Stanley Kubrick, and Kirk Douglas is the leading star. It's based on true events, and well worth a watch.
The French used its own artillery on its own troops to subdue a rebellion. The Germans were never aware of what was going on in the French lines, or they might have exploited the low morale of the French troops to great advantage.
Regarding Gettysburg, as part of Lee’s advance into Pennsylvania, the Second Battle of Winchester was fought: 13 – 15 June, 1863. In that battle, Confederate forces successfully stormed and carried fortified positions. Union losses numbered 4,443 (killed, wounded, missing and captured). Confederate losses numbered 269. This battle served to underscore Lee's belief that Rebel elan could achieve remarkable things on the battlefield.
On July 1st at Gettysburg, Lee struck the Union right hard. On July 2nd, he hit the Union left hard. On July 3rd, 1863, Lee incorrectly believed Meade – btw, this was Lee’s first encounter with Meade – would have adjusted his forces to reinforce his left and right flanks; thus, leaving the center weak. Plus, Lee knew his army lacked supplies. That was one of the factors that, in Lee’s mind, necessitated the attack.
Colonel Alexander had informed Longstreet that his batteries had limited ammunition to support the fatal charge. When Longstreet directed Alexander to secure more ammunition, Alexander explained that action would cause a delay enabling the Union to recover, prepare and reinforce against the impending Confederate infantry attack.
Hence, Lee knew his army couldn’t remain in position and wait for Meade to press an attack much more than a day without better logistical support. Lee also knew any attempt by his force to disengage from Meade’s army without first bloodying its nose would result in fighting-footrace to the Potomac: a fighting-footrace the Confederates might well lose.
To be successful, Lee's plan depended on Stuart’s cavalry actions in the Union rear and Colonel Alexander’s two-hour preparatory artillery barrage to ‘soften’ Meade’s center. Fact is, Meade did not make those adjustments, and both Stuart’s cavalry diversion and Alexander’s artillery barrage with faulty ammunition also failed to make a dent.
Lee’s soldiers did cross the wheat field, and they did gain the wall. They were just not strong enough to capture and hold the position. Lee met the retreat telling the men that the loss was his fault – not theirs. And Pickett did tell Lee that he had lost his division. Pickett's animus for Lee lasted until his death.
Afterwards, Lee wrote a letter to President Jefferson Davis to explain his actions, "[W]ith the knowledge I then had, & in the circumstances I was then placed, I do not know what better course I could have pursued":
Quote:
Camp Culpeper, Virginia
July 31, 1863
Mr. President
Your note of the 27 [sic] enclosing a slip from the Charleston Mercury relative to the battle of Gettysburg is received. I much regret its general censure upon the operations of the army, as it is calculated to do us no good either at home or abroad. But I am prepared for similar criticism & as far as I am concerned the remarks fall harmless. I am particularly sorry however that from partial information & mere assumption of facts that injustice should be done any officer, & that occasion should be taken to asperse your conduct, who of all others are most free of blame. I do not fear that your position in the confidence of the people, can be injured by such attacks, & I hope the official reports will protect the reputation of every officer. These cannot be made at once, & in the meantime as you state much falsehood may be promulgated. But truth is mighty & will eventually prevail. As regards the article in question I think it contains its own contradiction. Although charging Heth with the failure of the battle, it expressly states he was absent wounded. The object of the writer & publisher is evidently to cast discredit upon the operations of the Government & those connected with it & thus gratify feelings more to be pitied than to be envied. To take notice of such attacks would I think do more harm than good, & would be just what is desired. The delay that will necessarily occur in receiving official reports has induced me to make for the information of the Department a brief outline of operations of the army, in which however I have been unable to state the conduct of troops or officers. It is sufficient to show what was done & what was not done. No blame can be attached to the army for its failure to accomplish what was projected by me, nor should it be censured for the unreasonable expectations of the public. I am alone to blame, in perhaps expecting too much of its prowess & valor. It however in my opinion achieved under the guidance of the Most High a general success, though it did not win a victory. I thought at the time that the latter was practicable. I still think if all things could have worked together it would have been accomplished. But with the knowledge I then had, & in the circumstances I was then placed, I do not know what better course I could have pursued. With my present knowledge, & could I have foreseen that the attack on the last day would have failed to drive the enemy from his position, I should certainly have tried some other course. What the ultimate result would have been is not so clear to me. Our loss has been heavy, that of the enemy's proportionally so. His crippled condition enabled us to retire from the country comparatively unmolested. The unexpected state of the Potomac was our only embarrassment. I will not trespass upon Your Excellency's time more. With prayers for your health & happiness, & the recognition by your grateful country of your great services
The Somme at 100: Now and Then
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