This horse shit from the left just solidifies that the left has ZERO self-awarness of their distructive policies.

[bb1961]

This bitch is crying that letting immigrants into the USA to get on the taxpayer payroll is a BAD THING?? So justices on the SCOTUS not in favor of this is basis toward Trump administration?? Attacking her colleagues because they do agree with her liberal ideology. You don't hear the conservatives on the SCOTUS crying like this bitch. This bitch just wants more people sucking on the taxpayer tit...just expanding the democrap base. This whole article is liberal hand wringing and nonsensical liberal talking points...A BUNCH OF FUCKING LIBERAL CRY BABIES!!


Sonia Sotomayor Just Accused the Supreme Court’s Conservatives of Bias Toward the Trump Administration
By Mark Joseph Stern
Feb 21, 202010:54 PM
On Friday evening, by a 5–4 vote, the Supreme Court allowed the Trump administration’s wealth test for immigrants to take effect in Illinois. All four liberal justices dissented from the order, which changes relatively little: Thanks to the conservative justices’ intervention in January, the wealth test was poised to take effect in 49 states, and Friday’s vote lets the government apply it in the last state left. What’s most remarkable about the decision is Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s withering dissent, which calls out—with startling candor—a distressing pattern: The court’s Republican appointees have a clear bias toward the Trump administration.
Trump’s wealth test marks a brazen attempt to limit legal immigration by forcing immigrants to prove their financial status to enter, or remain in, the United States. It goes far beyond any statute passed by Congress, forcing immigrants to demonstrate that they will be not a “public charge”—that is, they won’t rely on any public assistance, including Medicaid, housing vouchers, and food stamps. Because the policy departs so dramatically from federal law, several courts blocked its implementation in 2019. In January, however, the Supreme Court allowed the wealth test to take effect over the dissent of all four liberals. The majority did not explain its reasoning. But Justice Neil Gorsuch, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, wrote a concurrence complaining that a district court had blocked it across the country, decrying the “rise of nationwide injunctions.”

Gorsuch’s opinion raised the possibility that the conservative justices disapproved of the scope of the district court’s injunction, not the reasoning behind it. If that were true, the conservatives should not have unsettled a narrower injunction limited to Illinois. But they did just that on Friday, once again without explaining themselves. Once again, the liberals dissented, but only Sotomayor wrote separately, in an opinion notable for its caustic tone and candid assessment of her colleague’s prejudices. “Today’s decision follows a now-familiar pattern,” Sotomayor began. “The Government seeks emergency relief from this Court, asking it to grant a stay where two lower courts have not. The Government insists—even though review in a court of appeals is imminent—that it will suffer irreparable harm if this Court does not grant a stay. And the Court yields.” In other words, SCOTUS rewarded the Department of Justice for short-circuiting the appellate process and demanding immediate relief.

“But this application is perhaps even more concerning than past ones,” Sotomayor continued. Previously, the DOJ “professed urgency because of the form of relief granted in the prior case—a nationwide injunction.” Now there’s no nationwide injunction, so there’s no apparent “urgency.” The DOJ “cannot state with precision any of the supposed harm that would come from the Illinois-specific injunction, and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has scheduled oral argument for next week.” Yet SCOTUS lifted the injunction anyway. “It is hard,” Sotomayor wrote, “to say what is more troubling: that the Government would seek this extraordinary relief seemingly as a matter of course, or that the Court would grant it.”
Normally, “to justify upending the normal rules,” the government “must also show a likelihood of irreparable harm.” And “it has not made that showing here.” But this shortcut to SCOTUS has become “the new normal”; it has happened over and over and over again, as the DOJ leapfrogs over the lower courts to seize a victory at the Supreme Court. Sotomayor explained:

Claiming one emergency after another, the Government has recently sought stays in an unprecedented number of cases, demanding immediate attention and consuming limited Court resources in each. And with each successive application, of course, its cries of urgency ring increasingly hollow.

But the Supreme Court’s conservatives repeatedly accept the DOJ’s declarations of an “emergency,” giving Donald Trump whatever he wants.
This practice, Sotomayor wrote, has “benefited one litigant over all others”: the Trump administration. And the injustice of this favoritism is especially painful in light of the court’s recent refusal to halt unconstitutional executions. “This Court often permits executions—where the risk of irreparable harm is the loss of life—to proceed,” Sotomayor noted, blaming death row inmates for their ostensible failure “to raise any potentially meritorious claims in a timely manner.” She concluded:

Yet the Court’s concerns over quick decisions wither when prodded by the Government in far less compelling circumstances—where the Government itself chose to wait to seek relief, and where its claimed harm is continuation of a 20-year status quo in one State. I fear that this disparity in treatment erodes the fair and balanced decisionmaking process that this Court must strive to protect.

Put simply: When some of the most despised and powerless among us ask the Supreme Court to spare their lives, the conservative justices turn a cold shoulder. When the Trump administration demands permission to implement some cruel, nativist, and potentially unlawful immigration restrictions, the conservatives bend over backward to give it everything it wants. There is nothing “fair and balanced” about the court’s double standard that favors the government over everyone else. And, as Sotomayor implies, this flagrant bias creates the disturbing impression that the Trump administration has a majority of the court in its pocket.

[friendly fred]

We don't need anymore poor people in this country when millions of people are homeless or hooked on [prohibited topic] and are getting public assistance!

Fuckers want to come to this country they need to bring lots of money or go somewhere else!

[dilbert firestorm]

the left bench is showing their activist face.


whatever they feel is emotive right or wrong instead of spock like rationality.

[Unique_Carpenter]

I have always found it amusing that the far right, and the far left, both have platforms that resemble dictatorships.

[HoeHummer]

Is your Supreme Court political at all?

LOLLING at the poor Trumpholians.

[the_real_Barleycorn]

Originally Posted by Unique_Carpenter

I have always found it amusing that the far right, and the far left, both have platforms that resemble dictatorships.

There are very few really far right people in this country but the far left...19% of self identified liberals on campus oppose free speech for those they find objectionable.

[eccieuser9500]

Originally Posted by bb1961

This bitch is crying that letting immigrants into the USA to get on the taxpayer payroll is a BAD THING?? So justices on the SCOTUS not in favor of this is basis toward Trump administration?? Attacking her colleagues because they do agree with her liberal ideology. You don't hear the conservatives on the SCOTUS crying like this bitch. This bitch just wants more people sucking on the taxpayer tit...just expanding the democrap base. This whole article is liberal hand wringing and nonsensical liberal talking points...A BUNCH OF FUCKING LIBERAL CRY BABIES!!

Kettle . . . meet pot. He's black too.

Originally Posted by dilbert firestorm

the left bench is showing their activist face.


whatever they feel is emotive right or wrong instead of spock like rationality.

Spock?

dissenting opinion

Cite as: 589 U. S. ____ (2020)

1

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 19A905
CHAD WOLF, ACTING SECRETARY OF HOMELAND
SECURITY, ET AL. v. COOK COUNTY,
ILLINOIS, ET AL.
ON APPLICATION FOR STAY
[February 21, 2020]

The application for stay presented to JUSTICE
KAVANAUGH and by him referred to the Court is granted,
and the District Court’s October 14, 2019 order granting a
preliminary injunction is stayed pending disposition of the
Government’s appeal in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit and disposition of the Government’s
petition for a writ of certiorari, if such writ is timely sought.
Should the petition for a writ of certiorari be denied, this
stay shall terminate automatically. In the event the peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari is granted, the stay shall termi-
nate upon the sending down of the judgment of this Court.

JUSTICE GINSBURG, JUSTICE BREYER, and JUSTICE
KAGAN would deny the application.

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, dissenting from the grant of stay.

Today’s decision follows a now-familiar pattern. The
Government seeks emergency relief from this Court, asking
it to grant a stay where two lower courts have not. The
Government insists—even though review in a court of ap-
peals is imminent—that it will suffer irreparable harm if
this Court does not grant a stay. And the Court yields.

But this application is perhaps even more concerning
than past ones. Just weeks ago, this Court granted a stay
of a different decision involving the same administrative
rule at issue here, after the Government professed urgency because of the form of relief granted in the prior case—a
nationwide injunction. The Government now uses that
stay—of a nationwide injunction—to insist that it is enti-
tled to one here. But the injunction in this case is limited
to one State, Illinois. The Government cannot state with
precision any of the supposed harm that would come from
the Illinois-specific injunction, and the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit has scheduled oral argument for next
week. The Government’s professed harm, therefore, boils
down to an inability to enforce its immigration goals, possi-
bly in only the immediate term, in one of 50 States. It is
hard to say what is more troubling: that the Government
would seek this extraordinary relief seemingly as a matter
of course, or that the Court would grant it.

This case concerns a provision of the Immigration and
Nationality Act that renders inadmissible any noncitizen
who “is likely at any time to become a public charge.” 8
U. S. C. §1182(a)(4)(A). The provision instructs immigra-
tion officers to consider, “at a minimum,” a person’s “age;
health; family status; assets, resources, and financial sta-
tus; and education and skills” in determining inadmissibil-
ity on this “public charge” basis. §1182(a)(4)(B). For the
last 20 years, field guidance has defined “public charge” as
a person “primarily dependent on the government for sub-
sistence.” 64 Fed. Reg. 28689 (1999) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Per that guidance, immigration officers
were not to consider non-cash public benefits in deciding
whether a noncitizen met that definition.

In August 2019, the Department of Homeland Security
issued a regulation that changed this longstanding defini-
tion. This new regulation (the public-charge rule) now de-
fines a “public charge” as “an alien who receives one or more
designated public benefits for more than 12 months in the
aggregate within any 36-month period (such that, for in-
stance, receipt of two benefits in one month counts as two
months).” 84 Fed. Reg. 41292, 41295. The regulation also expands the type of benefits that may render a noncitizen
inadmissible, including non-cash benefits such as the Sup-
plemental Nutrition Assistance Program (formerly food
stamps), most forms of Medicaid, and various forms of hous-
ing assistance. Ibid.

Several lawsuits followed, one of which reached this
Court last month. See Application for Stay of Injunctions
in Department of Homeland Security v. New York, No.
19A785 (New York cases). The Government in no small
part insisted that it was entitled to a stay because of the
scope of relief awarded below: The District Court in the New
York cases imposed a nationwide injunction that “rendered
effectively academic” the Government’s successful litigation
on the public-charge rule elsewhere. Id., at 4. The Govern-
ment’s unquestionable focus was the scope of that injunc-
tion: Its stay application used the word “nationwide” 34
times.

Over the dissent of four Justices, this Court granted the
Government’s application for a stay. Department of Home-
land Security v. New York, 589 U. S. ___ (2020). Two Jus-
tices concurred in the grant of the stay, emphasizing—as
the Government did—the “equitable and constitutional
questions raised by the rise of nationwide injunctions.” Id.,
at ___ (GORSUCH, J., concurring in grant of stay) (slip op.,
at 5). No Member of the Court discussed the application’s
merit apart from its challenges to the injunction’s nation-
wide scope.

In the meantime, other courts considered the public-
charge rule, and one—the District Court in this case—ruled
much more narrowly. The District Court concluded that the
plaintiffs in the case before it were entitled to a preliminary
injunction, based on self-described “dry and arguably blood-
less” legal analysis. Cook County v. McAleenan, ___
F. Supp. 3d ___, ___, 2019 WL 5110267, *14 (ND Ill., Oct.
14, 2019). But it did not award nationwide relief as the New
York court had: It merely prevented the Government from enforcing the public-charge rule in Illinois, where the
“‘nearly 100 nonprofit organizations and social and health
service providers’” represented by one of the plaintiffs were
located. Ibid.

After the District Court declined to stay enforcement of
its injunction pending appeal, the Government asked the
Seventh Circuit to intervene and stay the injunction itself.
On December 23, 2019, the Seventh Circuit declined, and
instead set an expedited briefing schedule to ensure prompt
consideration of the issue. As part of that expedited sched-
ule, the Seventh Circuit set oral argument for February 26,
2020—five days from now.

Notably, the Government initially chose not to appeal the
Seventh Circuit’s decision denying a stay. Instead, while
letting the normal appellate process play out in this case, it
urged this Court to review a later issued decision granting
a nationwide injunction—in no small part because it was a
nationwide injunction. Yet now that this Court acceded to
that request, the Government wants more: It asks this
Court to grant a stay of the District Court’s considered—
and considerably narrower—order below.

One might wonder what the trouble is with granting a
stay in this case. After all, by granting a stay in the New
York cases, the Court effectively has already allowed the
Government to enforce the public-charge rule elsewhere—
why not Illinois too? But—even putting aside the dissent
of four Justices in the New York cases and the plaintiffs’
weighty arguments on the merits—the Court should not
forget the burden the Government must carry to obtain a
stay. To warrant this “‘extraordinary’” relief, Williams v.
Zbaraz, 442 U. S. 1309, 1316 (1979) (Stevens, J., in cham-
bers), it is not enough for a party to point to an important
legal issue, or even one that is likely to obtain the assent of
five Justices on the merits (which is far from certain here).
Instead, to justify upending the normal rules of appellate procedure, a party must also show a likelihood of irrepara-
ble harm. Packwood v. Senate Select Comm. on Ethics, 510
U. S. 1319, 1320 (1994) (Rehnquist, C. J., in chambers).
And “[b]ecause this matter is pending before the Court of
Appeals, and because the Court of Appeals denied” the Gov-
ernment’s motion for a stay, the Government now bears “an
especially heavy burden.” Ibid.

The Government has not made that showing here. Its
public-charge rule is set to go into effect in 49 of 50 States
next week. The Seventh Circuit is set to consider the
Illinois-specific injunction next week as well, with a deci-
sion to follow shortly thereafter. And the Government is
unable to articulate how many cases—if any—this narrow
injunction would affect in the meantime. In sum, the Gov-
ernment’s only claimed hardship is that it must enforce an
existing interpretation of an immigration rule in one
State—just as it has done for the past 20 years—while an
updated version of the rule takes effect in the remaining 49.
The Government has not quantified or explained any bur-
dens that would arise from this state of the world. Indeed,
until this Court granted relief in the New York cases, the
Government itself did not consider this Illinois-specific
harm serious enough to warrant asking this Court for relief.

These facts—all of which undermine the Government’s
assertion of irreparable harm—show two things, one about
the Government’s conduct and one about this Court’s own.
First, the Government has come to treat “th[e] exceptional
mechanism” of stay relief “as a new normal.” Barr v. East
Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 588 U. S. ___, ___ (2019)
(SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting from grant of stay) (slip op., at
5). Claiming one emergency after another, the Government
has recently sought stays in an unprecedented number of
cases, demanding immediate attention and consuming lim-
ited Court resources in each. And with each successive ap-
plication, of course, its cries of urgency ring increasingly
hollow. Indeed, its behavior relating to the public-charge rule in particular shows how much its own definition of ir-
reparable harm has shifted. Having first sought a stay in
the New York cases based, in large part, on the purported
harm created by a nationwide injunction, it now disclaims
that rationale and insists that the harm is its temporary
inability to enforce its goals in one State.

Second, this Court is partly to blame for the breakdown
in the appellate process. That is because the Court—in this
case, the New York cases, and many others—has been all
too quick to grant the Government’s “reflexiv[e]” requests.
Ibid. But make no mistake: Such a shift in the Court’s own
behavior comes at a cost.

Stay applications force the Court to consider important
statutory and constitutional questions that have not been
ventilated fully in the lower courts, on abbreviated timeta-
bles and without oral argument. They upend the normal
appellate process, putting a thumb on the scale in favor of
the party that won a stay. (Here, the Government touts
that in granting a stay in the New York cases, this Court
“necessarily concluded that if the court of appeals were to
uphold the preliminary injunctio[n], the Court likely would
grant a petition for a writ of certiorari” and that “there was
a fair prospect the Court would rule in favor of the govern-
ment.” Application 3.) They demand extensive time and
resources when the Court’s intervention may well be unnec-
essary—particularly when, as here, a court of appeals is
poised to decide the issue for itself.

Perhaps most troublingly, the Court’s recent behavior on
stay applications has benefited one litigant over all others.
This Court often permits executions—where the risk of ir-
reparable harm is the loss of life—to proceed, justifying
many of those decisions on purported failures “to raise any
potentially meritorious claims in a timely manner.” Mur-
phy v. Collier, 587 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (second statement
of KAVANAUGH, J.) (slip op., at 4); see also id., at ___ (ALITO,
J., joined by THOMAS and GORSUCH, JJ., dissenting from grant of stay) (slip op., at 6) (“When courts do not have ad-
equate time to consider a claim, the decisionmaking process
may be compromised”); cf. Dunn v. Ray, 586 U. S. ___ (2019)
(overturning the grant of a stay of execution). Yet the
Court’s concerns over quick decisions wither when prodded
by the Government in far less compelling circumstances—
where the Government itself chose to wait to seek relief,
and where its claimed harm is continuation of a 20-year sta-
tus quo in one State. I fear that this disparity in treatment
erodes the fair and balanced decisionmaking process that
this Court must strive to protect.












I respectfully dissent.

GET ANGRY!

[eccieuser9500]

Originally Posted by the_real_Barleycorn

There are very few really far right people in this country but the far left...19% of self identified liberals on campus oppose free speech for those they find objectionable.

[HoeHummer]

Another one-Star thread from our one-Star genital!

LOLLING you, angry loser

[oeb11]

9500- any reply to the anti- First Amendment stance of Fascist DPST SS (Socialist Swine) ???

or, just the usual meaningless memes and waste of bandwidth.


Even nerds know Star Trek Spock is intellectual without emotion.

[HoeHummer]

Originally Posted by oeb11

9500- any reply to the anti- First Amendment stance of Fascist DPST SS (Socialist Swine) ???

or, just the usual meaningless memes and waste of bandwidth.

Give your balls a tug, titfucker

[eccieuser9500]

On a related note: when Bernie wins the Whitehouse, find out if you can go back to Europe. There are recent updates to work there.


Moving to the European Union?


https://ec.europa.eu/immigration/node_en

Welcome to the EU Immigration Portal. On these pages you can find practical information about coming to work or study in the EU for more than 90 days and on how to join your family in the EU. If you already are in the EU and you would like to know more about your rights or you would like to move from one EU country to another, you can also find relevant information on this Portal.

[oeb11]

Originally Posted by eccieuser9500

On a related note: when Bernie wins the Whitehouse, find out if you can go back to Europe. There are recent updates to work there.


Moving to the European Union?


https://ec.europa.eu/immigration/node_en

Who are you referring to, 9500?????
Bernie wins the White House - ????
More likely to win the Kremlin from Putin!

[eccieuser9500]

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsh...gration-policy

Immigration policy

A forward-looking and comprehensive European immigration policy, based on solidarity, is a key objective for the European Union. Immigration policy is intended to establish a balanced approach to dealing with both regular and irregular immigration.

Legal basis

Articles 79 and 80 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

Competences

Regular immigration: the EU is competent to lay down the conditions governing entry into and legal residence in a Member State, including for the purposes of family reunification, for third-country nationals. Member States retain the right to determine volumes of admission for people coming from third countries to seek work.

Integration: the EU may provide incentives and support for measures taken by Member States to promote the integration of legally resident third-country nationals; EU law makes no provision for the harmonisation of national laws and regulations, however.

Combating irregular immigration: the European Union is required to prevent and reduce irregular immigration, in particular by means of an effective return policy, in a manner consistent with fundamental rights.

Readmission agreements: the European Union is competent to conclude agreements with third countries for the readmission to their country of origin or provenance of third-country nationals who do not fulfil or no longer fulfil the conditions for entry into, or presence or residence in, a Member State.Immigration policy is intended to establish a balanced approach to dealing with both regular and irregular immigration.

Objectives

Defining a balanced approach to immigration: the EU aims to set up a balanced approach to managing regular immigration and combating irregular immigration. Proper management of migration flows entails ensuring fair treatment of third-country nationals residing legally in Member States, enhancing measures to combat irregular immigration, including trafficking and smuggling, and promoting closer cooperation with non-member countries in all fields. It is the EU’s aim to establish a uniform level of rights and obligations for regular immigrants, comparable to that for EU citizens.

Principle of solidarity: under the Lisbon Treaty, immigration policies are to be governed by the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, including its financial implications, between the Member States (Article 80 TFEU).

Achievements

A. Institutional developments brought about by the Lisbon Treaty

The Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force in December 2009 (1.1.5), introduced qualified majority voting on regular immigration and a new legal basis for integration measures. The ordinary legislative procedure now applies to policies on both irregular and regular immigration, making Parliament a co-legislator on an equal footing with the Council. The provisional measures to be taken in the event of a sudden inflow of third-country nationals are adopted by the Council alone, however, after consulting Parliament (Article 78(3) TFEU).

The Lisbon Treaty also made it clear that the EU shares competence in this field with the Member States, in particular as regards the number of migrants allowed to enter a Member State to seek work (Article 79(5) TFEU). Finally, the Court of Justice now has full jurisdiction in the field of immigration and asylum.

B. Recent policy developments

1. The ‘Global Approach to Migration and Mobility’

The ‘Global Approach to Migration and Mobility’ (GAMM) adopted by the Commission in 2011 establishes a general framework for the EU’s relations with third countries in the field of migration. It is based on four pillars: regular immigration and mobility, irregular immigration and trafficking in human beings, international protection and asylum policy, and maximising the impact of migration and mobility on development. The human rights of migrants are a cross-cutting issue in the context of this approach.

2. The June 2014 strategic guidelines

The Stockholm Programme for the area of freedom, security and justice (AFSJ), adopted in December 2009 as a successor to the multiannual programmes adopted at Tampere (1999) and The Hague (2004), expired in December 2014 (4.2.1). In March 2014, the Commission published a new communication setting out its vision on the future agenda for the AFSJ, entitled ‘An open and secure Europe: making it happen‘. In accordance with Article 68 TFEU, in its conclusions of 26 and 27 June 2014 the European Council then defined the ‘strategic guidelines for legislative and operational planning within the area of freedom, security and justice’ for the 2014-2020 period. These no longer constitute a programme, but rather guidelines focusing on the objective of transposing, implementing and consolidating the existing legal instruments and measures. The guidelines stress the need to adopt a holistic approach to migration, making the best possible use of regular migration, affording protection to those who need it, combating irregular migration and managing borders effectively.

3. European Agenda on Migration

On 13 May 2015, the Commission published the European Agenda on Migration. The Agenda proposes immediate measures to cope with the crisis in the Mediterranean and measures to be taken over the next few years to manage all aspects of immigration more effectively.

As regards the medium and long term, the Commission proposes guidelines in four policy areas:

• Reducing incentives for irregular immigration;
  Border management – saving lives and securing external borders;
• Developing a stronger common asylum policy; and
• Establishing a new policy on regular immigration, modernising and revising the ‘blue card’ system, setting fresh priorities for integration policies, and optimising the benefits of migration policy for the individuals concerned and for countries of origin.

The Agenda also launched the idea of setting up EU-wide relocation and resettlement schemes (see fact sheet on asylum policy 4.2.2), announced the ‘Hotspot’ approach (where relevant EU agencies work on the ground with frontline Member States to swiftly identify, register and fingerprint incoming migrants), and proposed a possible common security and defence policy (CSDP) operation in the Mediterranean to dismantle smuggling networks and combat trafficking in persons (which was launched soon afterwards as EUNAVFOR MED – Operation Sophia).

On the basis of this agenda, on 6 April 2016 the Commission published its guidelines on regular migration, as well as on asylum, in a communication. There are four main strands to the guidelines as regards regular migration policies: revising the Blue Card Directive, attracting innovative entrepreneurs to the EU, developing a more coherent and effective model for regular immigration in the EU by assessing the existing framework, and strengthening cooperation with the key countries of origin, with a view to ensuring legal pathways to the EU while at the same time improving returns of those who have no right to stay.

In October 2019, the Commission published a progress report on the implementation of the European Agenda on Migration, which examines progress made and shortcomings in the implementation of the Agenda.

All policy developments are closely monitored by the European Migration Network, established in 2008 as an EU network of migration and asylum experts from all Member States, who work together to provide objective, comparable and policy-relevant information.

C. Recent legislative developments

Since 2008, a number of significant directives on immigration have been adopted and several have already been revised.

1. Regular immigration

Following the difficulties encountered in adopting a general provision covering all labour immigration into the EU, the current approach consists of adopting sectoral legislation, by category of migrants, in order to establish a regular immigration policy at EU level.

Directive 2009/50/EC on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment created the ‘EU blue card’, a fast-track procedure for issuing a special residence and work permit, on more attractive terms, to enable third-country workers to take up highly qualified employment in the Member States. The first report on the implementation of this directive was published in May 2014 and identified several shortcomings. In June 2016, the Commission proposed a revision of the system, including less stringent admissions criteria, a lower salary threshold/minimum length of the work contract required, better family reunification provisions, and the abolition of parallel national schemes; work on this revision is ongoing in Parliament (the LIBE Committee report was adopted on 15 June 2017) and the Council, although, lately, progress in the Council has stalled, especially on the inclusion of skills and the recognition of professional experience equivalent to education qualifications, as well as on the possibility of maintaining parallel national schemes.

The Single Permit Directive (2011/98/EU) sets out a common, simplified procedure for third-country nationals applying for a residence and work permit in a Member State, as well as a common set of rights to be granted to regular immigrants. The latest implementation report, adopted in March 2019, found that third-country nationals lacking information about their rights hampers the directive’s objective of promoting their integration and non-discrimination.

Directive 2014/36/EU, adopted in February 2014, regulates the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purpose of employment as seasonal workers. Migrant seasonal workers are allowed to stay legally and temporarily in the EU for a maximum period of between five and nine months (depending on the Member State) to carry out an activity dependent on the passing of seasons, while retaining their principal place of residence in a third country. The directive also clarifies the set of rights to which such migrant workers are entitled.

Directive 2014/66/EU on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals in the framework of an intra-corporate transfer was adopted on 15 May 2014. The directive makes it easier for businesses and multinational corporations to temporarily relocate their managers, specialists and trainee employees to their branches or subsidiaries located in the European Union.

Directive (EU) 2016/801 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of research, studies, training, voluntary service, pupil exchange schemes or educational projects and au pairing was adopted on 11 May 2016, and was to be transposed by 23 May 2018. It replaces the previous instruments covering students and researchers, broadening their scope and simplifying their application.

Lastly, the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents in the European Union is still regulated by Council Directive 2003/109/EC, as amended in 2011 to extend its scope to refugees and other beneficiaries of international protection. The March 2019 implementation report found that, rather than actively promote the European long-term residence status, Member States issue mainly national long-term resident permits instead; and only a few third-country nationals use their right to move to other Member States. Current work on the Qualifications Directive (4.2.2) and the Blue Card Directive includes proposed amendments to the Directive on long-term residents.

Therefore, as observed by the Commission’s legal migration fitness check, published in March 2019, categories of regular migration not yet covered by EU legislation include workers who are not highly skilled and who come for periods of more than nine months, as well as investors and self-employed third-country nationals.

2. Integration

Council Directive 2003/86/EC sets out provisions on the right to family reunification, which go beyond the right to respect for private and family life of Article 8 ECHR. Given that the 2008 implementation report concluded that Directive 2003/86/EC had not been fully and correctly applied in the Member States, the Commission published a communication in April 2014 providing guidance to the Member States on how to apply it. The Commission’s legal migration fitness check also covers the family reunification directive.

The EU’s competence in the field of integration is limited. In July 2011, the Commission adopted the European Agenda for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals. More recently, in June 2016, the Commission put forward an action plan, setting out a policy framework and practical steps to help Member States integrate the 20 million non-EU nationals who are legally resident in the EU. Existing instruments include the European Migration Forum; the European Website on Integration; and the European Integration Network.

Specialised funding instruments to support national integration policies were based on the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) and the European Social Fund (ESF); as of 2021, under the new multiannual financial framework (MFF), it has been proposed that these funding instruments fall under the Asylum and Migration Fund (AMF) and ESF+.

3. Irregular immigration

The EU has adopted some major pieces of legislation to combat irregular immigration:

• The so-called ‘Facilitators Package’ comprises Council Directive 2002/90/EC, setting out a common definition of the crime of facilitating unauthorised entry, transit and residence, and Framework Decision 2002/946/JHA, establishing criminal sanctions for this conduct. Trafficking is addressed by Directive 2011/36/EU on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims. The package is complemented by Council Directive 2004/81/EC, providing for the granting of a residence permit to trafficked or smuggled persons who cooperate with the competent authorities (on trafficking, see also fact sheet on ‘Judicial cooperation in criminal matters’ 4.2.6). In May 2015, the Commission adopted the EU Action Plan against migrant smuggling (2015-2020), and, in line with the Action Plan, the Commission conducted a REFIT evaluation on the application of the existing legal framework, which was preceded by a public consultation. The Commission found that, at that point in time, there was not sufficient evidence pointing to actual and repeated prosecution of individuals or organisations for humanitarian assistance, and concluded that the EU legal framework addressing migrant smuggling remains necessary in the current context. It further found that a review of the Facilitators Package would not bring more added value than its effective and full implementation, while a general agreement emerged that non-legislative measures to support Member States’ authorities, civil society organisations or other stakeholders, including enhanced cooperation with third countries, could bring added value. The Parliament resolution of 5 July 2018 called on the Commission to develop guidelines for Member States to prevent humanitarian assistance from being criminalised, and a hearing was held on the topic in September 2018;
• The ‘Returns Directive’ (2008/115/EC) sets out common EU standards and procedures for returning irregularly resident third-country nationals. The first report on its implementation was adopted in March 2014. In September 2015, the Commission published the EU action plan on return, which was followed by the adoption, in October 2015, of the Council conclusions on the future of the return policy. In March 2017, the Commission supplemented the Action Plan with a communication on ‘a more effective return policy in the European Union – a renewed action plan’ and a recommendation on making returns more effective. In September 2017, it published its updated ‘Return Handbook‘, providing guidance relating to the performance of duties of national authorities competent for carrying out return-related tasks. Additionally, in 2016, Parliament and the Council adopted Regulation (EU) 2016/1953 on the establishment of a European travel document for the return of illegally staying third-country nationals. The recently revamped and strengthened European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) increasingly assists Member States in their return-related activities. In September 2018, the Commission proposed a targeted review of the Returns Directive, including a new border procedure for asylum applicants, clearer procedures and rules to prevent abuses, efficient voluntary return programmes to be set up in Member States, and clearer rules on detention. A targeted Parliament impact assessment found that the proposal would entail substantial costs for Member States through increased detention. There is no clear evidence that the proposal would lead to more effective returns, but it was likely to result in breaches of the fundamental rights of irregular migrants. Although negotiations are ongoing in Parliament and the Council, no specific agreement on the border procedure has been reached to date.
• Directive 2009/52/EC specifies sanctions and measures to be applied in Member States against employers of illegally resident third-country nationals. The first report on the implementation of the directive was submitted on 22 May 2014.
• Since 2001, Member States have mutually recognised their respective expulsion decisions (Directive 2001/40), whereby a decision by one Member State to expel a non-EU national present in another Member State is respected and complied with.

At the same time, the EU is negotiating and concluding readmission agreements with countries of origin and transit with a view to returning irregular migrants and cooperating in the fight against trafficking in human beings. The Joint Readmissions Committees, as foreseen in the readmission agreements, monitor the implementation thereof. These agreements are linked to visa facilitation agreements, which aim to provide the necessary incentive for readmission negotiations in the third country concerned without increasing irregular migration.

Recently, the Commission has also concluded informal arrangements on return and readmission (currently in force with five countries of origin in Africa), which have drawn heavy criticism from Parliament for falling outside of its scrutiny, and raised questions of accountability and transparency.

Role of the European Parliament

Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, Parliament has been actively involved, as a full co-legislator, in the adoption of new legislation dealing with both irregular and regular immigration.

Parliament has adopted numerous own-initiative resolutions addressing migration, in particular its resolution of 12 April 2016 on the situation in the Mediterranean and the need for a holistic EU approach to migration, which assesses the various policies at stake, and develops a set of recommendations. The LIBE report adopted in plenary was accompanied by the opinions of eight other committees of Parliament. The resolution encompasses Parliament’s position on all relevant EU policies on migration and asylum and is Parliament’s point of reference in this area.

Read more on this topic:

Migration in Europe

Migration crisis in Europe

EU asylum policy

[Levianon17]

Originally Posted by eccieuser9500

On a related note: when Bernie wins the Whitehouse, find out if you can go back to Europe. There are recent updates to work there.


Moving to the European Union?


https://ec.europa.eu/immigration/node_en

This is a funny post. Especially the part where you stated "When Bernie wins the Whitehouse". Nothing wrong with being optimistic though.