I haven't read the shadow Republican report, I'm looking for a link of the full report. But unless it establishes the threat level pre-Jan 6th, then it's lacking necessary detail.
I see that people have quoted Chief Sund which means they have given his words credence. Lets see what Chief Sund testified about the Jan 6th threat:
Despite the clear distinctions between the threat assessments for January 6 and the earlier
Million MAGA Marches, Mr. Sund’s testimony to the Committees and his February 1 letter to
Speaker Pelosi focused on the January 3 Special Assessment and the DIR’s threat assessment
language that anticipated similarities between January 6 and the prior events:
As previously mentioned, the IICD intelligence assessment indicated that the
January 6 protests/rallies were “expected to be similar to the previous Million
MAGA March rallies in November and December 2020, which drew tens of
thousands of participants.” The assessment indicated that members of the Proud
Boys, white supremacist groups, Antifa, and other extremist groups were expected
to participate in the January 6th event and that they may be inclined to become
violent. This was very similar to the intelligence assessment of the December 12,
2020, MAGA II event. In addition, on Monday, January 4, 2021, the USCP IICD
published the Daily Intelligence Report which provided an assessment of all of the
groups expected to demonstrate on January 6, 2021. The IICD Daily Intelligence
Report assessed “the level of probability of acts of civil disobedience/arrests
occurring based on current intelligence information,” as “Remote” to “Improbable”
for all of the groups expected to demonstrate on Wednesday, January 6, 2021. In
addition, the Daily Intelligence report indicated that “The Secretary of Homeland
Security has not issued an elevated or imminent alert at this time . . . .”
Similarly, during the February 23 hearing, Mr. Sund described the information possessed by
IICD as “very similar to the previous assessments. It was just a little bit more detailed.”
During the hearing Senator Leahy, in reference to the January 3 Special Assessment, asked Mr.
Sund, “How much more intelligence did we need than that?” Mr. Sund responded:
Yes, sir, that is correct. That is what the intelligence assessment said. It was very
similar to the intelligence assessments that we had for the November and December
MAGA marches. The intelligence assessments that we had developed for the
January 6 event all the way up until January 6 were all saying very much the same
thing, and that is what we had planned for.
We had planned for the possibility of
violence, the possibility of some people being armed, not the possibility of a
coordinated military style attack involving thousands against the Capitol.
https://www.rules.senate.gov/imo/med...s%20Report.pdf
A few things:
*Anyone citing Chief Sund's testimony on Jan 6th can no longer argue against that there was a coordinated military style attack involving thousands against the Capitol. See above.
*I'm reading the full report linked and while there are some conflicting reports, I don't see any indication that the level of violence that occurred should have been planned for. I just can't foresee any Republican giving input during pre-Jan 6th meeting that a rally by their President would need elevated USCP and DCNG than recommended.
* Also, it looks like any discussion of troops was that they were to be unarmed. Yeah, that would have gone well. I do think that there is an argument that if the DCNC would have been deployed, they would have been just as worse off as the USCP :
USCP Did Not Submit a Formal Request for National Guard Assistance to
the Capitol Police Board Prior to January 6
Prior to January 6, Mr. Sund failed to submit a formal request for National Guard support
to all members of the Capitol Police Board and thus, never sought nor received authority from
the Board to make any such request. His interactions were limited to informal conversations
with Mr. Irving, and Mr. Stenger. In fact, no one ever discussed the possibility of National
Guard support with the Board’s third voting member, the Architect of the Capitol, Brett
Blanton.
Mr. Sund testified that he asked the two SAAs to declare an emergency and authorize
National Guard assistance on Monday, January 4, but that this request was denied. Mr. Sund
testified to the Committees that on January 4 around 11:00 a.m., he met in person with Mr.
Irving to request that the Capitol Police Board make an emergency declaration and authorize the 66
assistance of the National Guard. Mr. Sund testified that Mr. Irving “was concerned with the
‘optics’ of having National Guard present,” did not believe the intelligence warranted assistance
from the National Guard, and therefore did not support the request. Mr. Sund further testified
that Mr. Irving referred him to Mr. Stenger to discuss the request. According to Mr. Sund, Mr.
Stenger did not approve the request, and instead suggested that Mr. Sund “lean forward” and
contact the National Guard to determine how quickly and what kind of assistance could be
provided if needed.
Acting on Mr. Stenger’s advice, Mr. Sund testified that he called General Walker, the
Commander of DCNG, around 6:45 p.m. on January 4; explained that he did not have the
authority to request assistance; and asked how quickly DCNG could respond to a request.
According to Mr. Sund, General Walker informed Mr. Sund that he had 125 National Guard
troops supporting COVID response in Washington, D.C. that could be repurposed if
necessary. Mr. Sund testified that he met in person with Mr. Stenger on January 5 around
12:00 p.m. and reported the conversation with General Walker. Mr. Sund also testified that
later in the day he told Mr. Irving about the conversation with General Walker. Mr. Sund did
not contact Mr. Blanton, the third voting member of the Capitol Police Board, regarding the
request.
General Walker corroborated the majority of Mr. Sund’s account. However, General
Walker testified that he spoke with Mr. Sund on January 3 and asked Mr. Sund whether he
would be requesting assistance from DCNG.443 According to General Walker, Mr. Sund told
him he was not allowed to request support, but asked: “if I do call you, will you be able to
support me?” General Walker testified that he responded, “[y]es, but I have to get approval
from the Secretary of the Army and ultimately the Secretary of Defense because it is a [f]ederal
request.”
Mr. Irving and Mr. Stenger disputed Mr. Sund’s testimony about his request for
emergency authorization for DCNG assistance. Neither Mr. Irving nor Mr. Stenger perceived
the conversations with Mr. Sund as a formal request to the Board. Mr. Irving testified that on
January 4, he spoke by phone with Mr. Sund, on a call that later included Mr. Stenger, about an
offer from the National Guard to provide 125 unarmed troops for traffic duty near the Capitol.
Mr. Irving testified that he, Mr. Sund, and Mr. Stenger collectively agreed the available
intelligence did not warrant having troops at the Capitol. Mr. Irving further testified that the
decision was not based on the optics of National Guard troops at the Capitol, contrary to Mr.
Sund’s testimony.
Mr. Blanton confirmed to the Committees that Mr. Sund never sought Capitol Police
Board approval to request National Guard presence in the days before January 6.Notably,
according to the Department of Defense (“DOD”) timeline, DOD officials confirmed with USCP
on January 3 and January 4 that USCP was not requesting National Guard support
* Hopefully people will read the report that I liked. There were definitely break downs in communication. I have no issues with this being investigated further. During the coordinated military style attack involving thousands against the Capitol, Speaker Nancy Pelosi did try to get the USCP additional support. There is a video supporting that. At one point she was in contact w/VP Mike Pence, not sure of the time frame though.
*A few other items from the report to note:
~~~~~
Opaque processes and a lack of emergency authority delayed requests for National
Guard assistance. The USCP Chief has no unilateral authority to request assistance from the
National Guard; the USCP Chief must submit a request for assistance to the Capitol Police Board
for approval. Steven Sund never submitted a formal request to the Capitol Police Board for
National Guard support in advance of January 6. Instead, Steven Sund had informal
conversations with the House Sergeant at Arms, Paul Irving, and the Senate Sergeant at Arms,
Michael Stenger, regarding the potential need for National Guard support. No one ever
discussed the possibility of National Guard support with the Architect of the Capitol, the third
voting member of the Capitol Police Board.
The members of the Capitol Police Board who were in charge on January 6 did not
appear to be fully familiar with the statutory and regulatory requirements for requesting National
Guard support, which contributed to the delay in deploying the National Guard to the Capitol. In
their testimony before the Committees, Paul Irving and Steven Sund offered different accounts of
when Steven Sund first requested National Guard assistance during the attack. Phone records
reveal a number of conversations between Steven Sund and Paul Irving on January 6. However,
because there is no transcription of the conversations, there is no way for the Committees to
determine when the request was made. National Guard assistance was delayed while Steven
Sund attempted to contact the Capitol Police Board members and obtain the required approvals.
Regardless of what time the request was made, the need to await Capitol Police Board approval
during an emergency hindered the ability to request District of Columbia National Guard
(“DCNG”) assistance quickly
~~~~~
The intelligence failures, coupled with the Capitol Police Board’s failure to request
National Guard assistance prior to January 6, meant DCNG was not activated, staged, and
prepared to quickly respond to an attack on the Capitol. As the attack unfolded, DOD
required time to approve the request and gather, equip, and instruct its personnel on the
mission, which resulted in additional delays. Prior to January 6, USCP informed DOD
officials on two separate occasions that it was not seeking DCNG assistance for the Joint Session
of Congress. The D.C. government, by contrast, did request unarmed troops for traffic support,
and on January 6, 154 unarmed DCNG personnel were staged at traffic control points throughout
the city. As the attack unfolded, USCP and the Metropolitan Police Department of the District of
Columbia (“MPD”) both pleaded with DOD officials for immediate assistance. DOD officials
claimed they received a “workable” request for assistance from USCP at approximately 2:30
p.m. The request was presented to the Acting Secretary of Defense and approved at
approximately 3:00 p.m. For the next ninety minutes, DOD officials ordered DCNG personnel
to return to the Armory, obtain necessary gear, and prepare for deployment as leaders quickly
prepared a mission plan.
Miscommunication and confusion during response preparations,
demonstrated by conflicting records about who authorized deployment and at what time,
contributed to the delayed deployment. DCNG began arriving at the Capitol Complex at 5:20
p.m.—nearly three hours after DOD received USCP’s request for assistance and more than four
hours after the barriers at the Capitol were first breache
EXAMINING THE U.S. CAPITOL ATTACK: A REVIEW OF THE SECURITY, PLANNING, AND RESPONSE FAILURES ON JANUARY 6
