So You Want to Have an INTELLIGENT Debate on Iran?

[lustylad]

This lengthy analysis appeared in the WSJ a week ago. It was written by two former Secretaries of State who possessed strategic vision and negotiating skills and were astute enough to steer us through the era of detente and historic nuclear arms reduction treaties with the former Soviet Union. They are neither partisan nor polemical - just calling it as it is. They are respectful of Obama and Kerry. Don't comment unless you read the whole article. It is thoughtful, penetrating, well-written and worth reading. If you do comment, offer something more intelligent than State Dept. spokeswoman Marie Harf, who said it had a lot of "big words".



The Iran Deal and Its Consequences

Mixing shrewd diplomacy with defiance of U.N. resolutions, Iran has turned the negotiation on its head.

By Henry Kissinger And George P. Shultz
Updated April 7, 2015 7:38 p.m. ET

The announced framework for an agreement on Iran’s nuclear program has the potential to generate a seminal national debate. Advocates exult over the nuclear constraints it would impose on Iran. Critics question the verifiability of these constraints and their longer-term impact on regional and world stability. The historic significance of the agreement and indeed its sustainability depend on whether these emotions, valid by themselves, can be reconciled.

Debate regarding technical details of the deal has thus far inhibited the soul-searching necessary regarding its deeper implications. For 20 years, three presidents of both major parties proclaimed that an Iranian nuclear weapon was contrary to American and global interests—and that they were prepared to use force to prevent it. Yet negotiations that began 12 years ago as an international effort to prevent an Iranian capability to develop a nuclear arsenal are ending with an agreement that concedes this very capability, albeit short of its full capacity in the first 10 years.

Mixing shrewd diplomacy with open defiance of U.N. resolutions, Iran has gradually turned the negotiation on its head. Iran’s centrifuges have multiplied from about 100 at the beginning of the negotiation to almost 20,000 today. The threat of war now constrains the West more than Iran. While Iran treated the mere fact of its willingness to negotiate as a concession, the West has felt compelled to break every deadlock with a new proposal. In the process, the Iranian program has reached a point officially described as being within two to three months of building a nuclear weapon. Under the proposed agreement, for 10 years Iran will never be further than one year from a nuclear weapon and, after a decade, will be significantly closer.

Inspections and Enforcement

The president deserves respect for the commitment with which he has pursued the objective of reducing nuclear peril, as does Secretary of State John Kerry for the persistence, patience and ingenuity with which he has striven to impose significant constraints on Iran’s nuclear program.

Progress has been made on shrinking the size of Iran’s enriched stockpile, confining the enrichment of uranium to one facility, and limiting aspects of the enrichment process. Still, the ultimate significance of the framework will depend on its verifiability and enforceability.

Negotiating the final agreement will be extremely challenging. For one thing, no official text has yet been published. The so-called framework represents a unilateral American interpretation. Some of its clauses have been dismissed by the principal Iranian negotiator as “spin.” A joint EU-Iran statement differs in important respects, especially with regard to the lifting of sanctions and permitted research and development.

Comparable ambiguities apply to the one-year window for a presumed Iranian breakout. Emerging at a relatively late stage in the negotiation, this concept replaced the previous baseline—that Iran might be permitted a technical capacity compatible with a plausible civilian nuclear program. The new approach complicates verification and makes it more political because of the vagueness of the criteria.

Under the new approach, Iran permanently gives up none of its equipment, facilities or fissile product to achieve the proposed constraints. It only places them under temporary restriction and safeguard—amounting in many cases to a seal at the door of a depot or periodic visits by inspectors to declared sites. The physical magnitude of the effort is daunting. Is the International Atomic Energy Agency technically, and in terms of human resources, up to so complex and vast an assignment?

In a large country with multiple facilities and ample experience in nuclear concealment, violations will be inherently difficult to detect. Devising theoretical models of inspection is one thing. Enforcing compliance, week after week, despite competing international crises and domestic distractions, is another. Any report of a violation is likely to prompt debate over its significance—or even calls for new talks with Tehran to explore the issue. The experience of Iran’s work on a heavy-water reactor during the “interim agreement” period—when suspect activity was identified but played down in the interest of a positive negotiating atmosphere—is not encouraging.
Compounding the difficulty is the unlikelihood that breakout will be a clear-cut event. More likely it will occur, if it does, via the gradual accumulation of ambiguous evasions.

When inevitable disagreements arise over the scope and intrusiveness of inspections, on what criteria are we prepared to insist and up to what point? If evidence is imperfect, who bears the burden of proof? What process will be followed to resolve the matter swiftly?

The agreement’s primary enforcement mechanism, the threat of renewed sanctions, emphasizes a broad-based asymmetry, which provides Iran permanent relief from sanctions in exchange for temporary restraints on Iranian conduct. Undertaking the “snap-back” of sanctions is unlikely to be as clear or as automatic as the phrase implies. Iran is in a position to violate the agreement by executive decision. Restoring the most effective sanctions will require coordinated international action. In countries that had reluctantly joined in previous rounds, the demands of public and commercial opinion will militate against automatic or even prompt “snap-back.” If the follow-on process does not unambiguously define the term, an attempt to reimpose sanctions risks primarily isolating America, not Iran.

The gradual expiration of the framework agreement, beginning in a decade, will enable Iran to become a significant nuclear, industrial and military power after that time—in the scope and sophistication of its nuclear program and its latent capacity to weaponize at a time of its choosing. Limits on Iran’s research and development have not been publicly disclosed (or perhaps agreed). Therefore Iran will be in a position to bolster its advanced nuclear technology during the period of the agreement and rapidly deploy more advanced centrifuges—of at least five times the capacity of the current model—after the agreement expires or is broken.

The follow-on negotiations must carefully address a number of key issues, including the mechanism for reducing Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium from 10,000 to 300 kilograms, the scale of uranium enrichment after 10 years, and the IAEA’s concerns regarding previous Iranian weapons efforts. The ability to resolve these and similar issues should determine the decision over whether or when the U.S. might still walk away from the negotiations.

The Framework Agreement and Long-Term Deterrence

Even when these issues are resolved, another set of problems emerges because the negotiating process has created its own realities. The interim agreement accepted Iranian enrichment; the new agreement makes it an integral part of the architecture. For the U.S., a decade-long restriction on Iran’s nuclear capacity is a possibly hopeful interlude. For Iran’s neighbors—who perceive their imperatives in terms of millennial rivalries—it is a dangerous prelude to an even more dangerous permanent fact of life. Some of the chief actors in the Middle East are likely to view the U.S. as willing to concede a nuclear military capability to the country they consider their principal threat. Several will insist on at least an equivalent capability. Saudi Arabia has signaled that it will enter the lists; others are likely to follow. In that sense, the implications of the negotiation are irreversible.

If the Middle East is “proliferated” and becomes host to a plethora of nuclear-threshold states, several in mortal rivalry with each other, on what concept of nuclear deterrence or strategic stability will international security be based? Traditional theories of deterrence assumed a series of bilateral equations. Do we now envision an interlocking series of rivalries, with each new nuclear program counterbalancing others in the region?

Previous thinking on nuclear strategy also assumed the existence of stable state actors. Among the original nuclear powers, geographic distances and the relatively large size of programs combined with moral revulsion to make surprise attack all but inconceivable. How will these doctrines translate into a region where sponsorship of nonstate proxies is common, the state structure is under assault, and death on behalf of jihad is a kind of fulfillment?

Some have suggested the U.S. can dissuade Iran’s neighbors from developing individual deterrent capacities by extending an American nuclear umbrella to them. But how will these guarantees be defined? What factors will govern their implementation? Are the guarantees extended against the use of nuclear weapons—or against any military attack, conventional or nuclear? Is it the domination by Iran that we oppose or the method for achieving it? What if nuclear weapons are employed as psychological blackmail? And how will such guarantees be expressed, or reconciled with public opinion and constitutional practices?

Regional Order

For some, the greatest value in an agreement lies in the prospect of an end, or at least a moderation, of Iran’s 3½ decades of militant hostility to the West and established international institutions, and an opportunity to draw Iran into an effort to stabilize the Middle East. Having both served in government during a period of American-Iranian strategic alignment and experienced its benefits for both countries as well as the Middle East, we would greatly welcome such an outcome. Iran is a significant national state with a historic culture, a fierce national identity, and a relatively youthful, educated population; its re-emergence as a partner would be a consequential event.

But partnership in what task? Cooperation is not an exercise in good feeling; it presupposes congruent definitions of stability. There exists no current evidence that Iran and the U.S. are remotely near such an understanding. Even while combating common enemies, such as ISIS, Iran has declined to embrace common objectives. Iran’s representatives (including its Supreme Leader) continue to profess a revolutionary anti-Western concept of international order; domestically, some senior Iranians describe nuclear negotiations as a form of jihad by other means.

The final stages of the nuclear talks have coincided with Iran’s intensified efforts to expand and entrench its power in neighboring states. Iranian or Iranian client forces are now the pre-eminent military or political element in multiple Arab countries, operating beyond the control of national authorities. With the recent addition of Yemen as a battlefield, Tehran occupies positions along all of the Middle East’s strategic waterways and encircles archrival Saudi Arabia, an American ally. Unless political restraint is linked to nuclear restraint, an agreement freeing Iran from sanctions risks empowering Iran’s hegemonic efforts.

Some have argued that these concerns are secondary, since the nuclear deal is a way station toward the eventual domestic transformation of Iran. But what gives us the confidence that we will prove more astute at predicting Iran’s domestic course than Vietnam’s, Afghanistan’s, Iraq’s, Syria’s, Egypt’s or Libya’s?

Absent the linkage between nuclear and political restraint, America’s traditional allies will conclude that the U.S. has traded temporary nuclear cooperation for acquiescence to Iranian hegemony. They will increasingly look to create their own nuclear balances and, if necessary, call in other powers to sustain their integrity. Does America still hope to arrest the region’s trends toward sectarian upheaval, state collapse and the disequilibrium of power tilting toward Tehran, or do we now accept this as an irremediable aspect of the regional balance?

Some advocates have suggested that the agreement can serve as a way to dissociate America from Middle East conflicts, culminating in the military retreat from the region initiated by the current administration. As Sunni states gear up to resist a new Shiite empire, the opposite is likely to be the case. The Middle East will not stabilize itself, nor will a balance of power naturally assert itself out of Iranian-Sunni competition. (Even if that were our aim, traditional balance of power theory suggests the need to bolster the weaker side, not the rising or expanding power.) Beyond stability, it is in America’s strategic interest to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war and its catastrophic consequences. Nuclear arms must not be permitted to turn into conventional weapons. The passions of the region allied with weapons of mass destruction may impel deepening American involvement.

If the world is to be spared even worse turmoil, the U.S. must develop a strategic doctrine for the region. Stability requires an active American role. For Iran to be a valuable member of the international community, the prerequisite is that it accepts restraint on its ability to destabilize the Middle East and challenge the broader international order.

Until clarity on an American strategic political concept is reached, the projected nuclear agreement will reinforce, not resolve, the world’s challenges in the region. Rather than enabling American disengagement from the Middle East, the nuclear framework is more likely to necessitate deepening involvement there—on complex new terms. History will not do our work for us; it helps only those who seek to help themselves.

Messrs. Kissinger and Shultz are former secretaries of state.

[WombRaider]

Very well-written piece. They obviously bring years of experience to bear on the subject. I like the sentence near the end where they say 'the passions of the region allied with weapons of mass destruction may impel deepening American involvement'. That's a civil way of saying muslim extremists can't be allowed to have the bomb. And I agree. As the rest of the piece illustrates however, the prospect of reaching that goal is daunting.

As they also mention, all sides are dealing with maintaining face in the midst of the negotiations. It's why Obama comes out to say there's a framework in place. It's why Khomeini then follows by disputing certain parts of the deal. Foreign policy is a back and forth exercise. And I also agree with them when they explain how Iran has us over a barrel, for lack of a better term. They could be a worthwhile ally in the region, but at what cost to us?

As much as I can't stand you, it's a reasoned and well-written article that perfectly outlines the difficulty we face in obtaining a lasting deal. It's also a perfect example of how some on this board (LL) who keep wanting to know if there's a deal or not or what it is, are playing checkers, while clearly this exercise requires those with the ability to play chess.

PS - while my hopes are not high, I'm thinking this could actually keep from devolving into something ugly if we actually keep on topic. We'll see if that happens.

[lustylad]

Originally Posted by WombRaider

And I also agree with them when they explain how Iran has us over a barrel, for lack of a better term.

They didn't say that. They said in effect we put ourselves over a barrel:

"The threat of war now constrains the West more than Iran. While Iran treated the mere fact of its willingness to negotiate as a concession, the West has felt compelled to break every deadlock with a new proposal."

As for chess playing, I never doubted the ability of Kissinger or Schultz to think 5-10 moves ahead. I don't have any such confidence in Obama and Kerry. Not being partisan, just stating the case.

[WombRaider]

Originally Posted by lustylad

They didn't say that. They said in effect we put ourselves over a barrel:

"The threat of war now constrains the West more than Iran. While Iran treated the mere fact of its willingness to negotiate as a concession, the West has felt compelled to break every deadlock with a new proposal."

As for chess playing, I never doubted the ability of Kissinger or Schultz to think 5-10 moves ahead. I don't have any such confidence in Obama and Kerry. Not being partisan, just stating the case.

Now you're arguing semantics. I didn't say Iran PUT us over said barrel, just that we are over one. As for chess playing, Obama and Kerry aren't the only parties involved.

[Jackie S]

Gentlemen, I think it is far more simple than this article conveys.

Iran is a Muslim Theocracy that negotiates from a standpoint that Islam is the one true religion, and all other belief systems, whether they be based on secular or religious beliefs, should be either converted, or destroyed.

They really believe this shit. And no amount of reasonable negotiations will change that. To think that you can reach an agreement with with a Fascist State that is run by Religous Fanatics is beyond wishful thinking. It is that unique combination of Stupidity and Naiveté that permiates the Obama State Dept.

[WombRaider]

Inherently, the entity that occupies Iran's position in a negotiation will have the upper hand. We are the ones seeking permanent change. They are happy to continue on with the status quo. I also agree with the gentlemen about sanctions. As long as countries like Russia don't abide by them, it could quickly become just the US that is participating.

[WombRaider]

Originally Posted by Jackie S

Gentlemen, I think it is far more simple than this article conveys.

Iran is a Muslim Theocracy that negotiates from a standpoint that Islam is the one true religion, and all other belief systems, whether they be based on secular or religious beliefs, should be either converted, or destroyed.

They really believe this shit. And no amount of reasonable negotiations will change that. To think that you can reach an agreement with with a Fascist State that is run by Religous Fanatics is beyond wishful thinking. It is that unique combination of Stupidity and Naiveté that permiates the Obama State Dept.

I think they use it as a means of control. Other administrations negotiated with them so you can't put it all on Obama and this administration.

[Jackie S]

Originally Posted by WombRaider

I think they use it as a means of control. Other administrations negotiated with them so you can't put it all on Obama and this administration.

Iran as it exist now, basically a Religious Thugocracy, is only about 35 years old. Other Administrations have attempted to " negotiate" with them from a position of strength, which is the one thing they understand.

In my opinion, the Mullas have been biding their time, waiting for a President who is naive enough to actually believe that they will keep their word, or for that matter, accept Western Civilization as their equal.

They do not think like we do. They do not have the same value system as we do. And most of all, they really believe that Allah and his Prophet has commanded them to either convert the World, or kill anyone who refuses.

Muhammad would be proud. He had to rely on swords, spears, and other such weaponry to "spread the word". His followers are on the verge of having the ultimate weapon in which to carry out "Gods work".

That should be a scary thought.

[LexusLover]

Originally Posted by lustylad

The Iran Deal and Its Consequences

Messrs. Kissinger and Shultz are former secretaries of state.

There is no "Iran Deal"! https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press...ic-republic-ir

"Important implementation details are still subject to negotiation, and nothing is agreed until everything is agreed."

And Obaminable "practiced" law?

[shanm]

Originally Posted by LexusLover

There is no "Iran Deal"! https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press...ic-republic-ir

"Important implementation details are still subject to negotiation, and nothing is agreed until everything is agreed."

And Obaminable "practiced" law?

Guess the "intelligent" part is over...since LLDoofus is here

[WombRaider]

Originally Posted by LexusLover

There is no "Iran Deal"! https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press...ic-republic-ir

"Important implementation details are still subject to negotiation, and nothing is agreed until everything is agreed."

And Obaminable "practiced" law?

Don't bring your bullshit in here. Go play checkers with the rest of the mouthbreathers. Seriously. I was wondering how long it would be before this turned into just another bullshit name-calling thread like all the rest and of course, as soon as you enter, here we go. We are trying to have a REAL discussion.

[WombRaider]

Originally Posted by Jackie S

Iran as it exist now, basically a Religious Thugocracy, is only about 35 years old. Other Administrations have attempted to " negotiate" with them from a position of strength, which is the one thing they understand.

In my opinion, the Mullas have been biding their time, waiting for a President who is naive enough to actually believe that they will keep their word, or for that matter, accept Western Civilization as their equal.

They do not think like we do. They do not have the same value system as we do. And most of all, they really believe that Allah and his Prophet has commanded them to either convert the World, or kill anyone who refuses.

Muhammad would be proud. He had to rely on swords, spears, and other such weaponry to "spread the word". His followers are on the verge of having the ultimate weapon in which to carry out "Gods work".

That should be a scary thought.

I think you give them too much credit. Biding their time, waiting for a president, etc.? C'mon, man you don't really believe that. If they wanted to do what they wanted to do, why wait at all? They've had a nuclear program for a LONG time. If they truly want a bomb, what is taking so long? They have the Russians' help. The Russians have a bomb. You think the Russians are above just selling them a few? Then what? What you're saying might not be wrong, but in the end, it might not matter. What are our options? Sanctions are always mentioned, but as the gentlemen mentioned in the piece, that relies on trusting others to carry out their end of the deal as well and in the end it could just be the United States that participates and that won't really do much if they still have all the other countries who will do business with them.

[lustylad]

Originally Posted by shanm

Guess the "intelligent" part is over...since LLDoofus is here

Originally Posted by WombRaider

Don't bring your bullshit in here.... We are trying to have a REAL discussion.

If you want to have a real discussion, then why don't you tell shammy to shut up?

LL does raise a valid point about whether the framework is a "deal" or a non-deal. Your previous point about "semantics" would apply here. Schultz/Kissinger don't get hung up on what you call it. If they waited until a final deal, it would be too late for their advice and opinions to influence the negotiations.


.

[shanm]

Originally Posted by lustylad

If you want to have a real discussion, then why don't you tell shammy to shut up?

LL does raise a valid point about whether the framework is a "deal" or a non-deal. Your previous point about "semantics" would apply here. Schultz/Kissinger don't get hung up on what you call it. If they waited until a final deal it would be too late for them to have input into the negotiations.


.

Because I only commented after LLDoofus's shit comment. I haven't read the article yet, so I decided not to comment on the thread until. Thought this might finally be a thread with some actual discussion until LLdoofus showed up with the same unsubstantiated puke that he spews in every other thread.

"Obaminable practiced "law"?"
He's obviously trying to start shit. I wouldn't expect you to call out your dick-daddy's inanity though, so I pretty much expected your comment.

[lustylad]

Originally Posted by WombRaider

Now you're arguing semantics. I didn't say Iran PUT us over said barrel, just that we are over one. As for chess playing, Obama and Kerry aren't the only parties involved.

This isn't semantics at all. How can we really be "over a barrel" if it is self-imposed? We don't HAVE to act like we are so war-averse. We don't HAVE to cave in just to keep the talks going. You claimed in other threads the Iranians stopped or slowed their nuclear program in 2003. If so, why do you think they did that? Because we were on their fucking doorstep pouring troops and weapons into Iraq, that's why. You also pointed out how many Iranians were educated in the US. That's how they are able to read us like a book, especially Obama and Kerry.

The reason there are 6 parties on our side of the table is because GWB wanted the Europeans to take a lead when the talks started 12 years ago. The Europeans have as much if not more at stake in stopping Iran from going nuclear as we do. And they needed to experience first-hand how the Iranians negotiate - so when the talks fail, they won't be sitting on the sidelines blaming us.

Of course, this P5+1 set-up gave the Iranians an opportunity to divide and conquer in the negotiations. If Kissinger or Schultz were involved, they would know how to neutralize this negotiating disadvantage.

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