7 reasons why Ronald Reagan was the worst President of our lifetime

[I B Hankering]

Originally Posted by WTF

Despite FAS.

I think, wait, I know Iran influnced our election in 1980. Had they released the hostages in October , Carter would have had a much better chance of beating Reagan.

That's a given!

Originally Posted by WTF

That was my point on your silly Don Knotts analogy. Just who was Don Knotts? Seems it was Reagan.

The correct metaphor would have been to cast Carter as "Barney Fife". No insult towards Don Knotts was intended.

Originally Posted by WTF

I said I think it happened. Now I never said that there is proof that Reagan did it or that the FAS were lying. With the data they had, they had no proof. I accept that.

[dilbert firestorm]

Originally Posted by WTF

dilbert, these are posts 148, 149, 150 and your last post was 157.

In post 148, I was addressing Munch (I think) pointing out that even linking things for some of you is a lesson in futility. Cutirpie says what he say about AP, you chime in about Reuters. Neither address the actual facts. Did Lee Atwater use a racist strategy and admit to it or not?

No you attack the source. Or you pile on the attack.

Now if you were being flippant and actually believe that in fact Atwater did indeed admit to such a strategy then my apologies. But if you were trying to dog pile with cutiepie and shoot the messenger too then forget it. So the question now is...Do you believe that Lee Atwater admitted using coded racial words as a strategy for Ronald Reagan's successful 1980 presidential campaign?


I am sorry it took so long, I played golf today and my New Dodge Truck that I had bragged about in another thread would not start. 6k miles. WTF is not a happy camper.

nah, no need to apologize for taking so long.

I understand what Atwater did which is why I did not participate in the Atwater sub-thread. I never said a word about Atwaters actions until now. He did what he did to help his candidate win and he apologized for it. I didn't think his apology was necessary given that it was a campaign strategy and anyone's fair game in that situation.

COG was commenting that AP was state controlled media, and I commented that he left out Reuters as the other media outfit. Yes, I was being flippant with the mention of Reuters.

[WTF]

Originally Posted by I B Hankering

That's a given!

If that is a given....what makes you so certain that they were scared of Reagan?

Sounds much more plausable that they were scared of Carter.

He was the one trying to get us off ME'ern oil.

Originally Posted by I B Hankering

The correct metaphor would have been to cast Carter as "Barney Fife". No insult towards Don Knotts was intended.

No , the correct metaphor would have Reagan as Barney Fife. They were not scared of Reagan, in fact they could kidnap our citizens by proxy and Ronnie would ship them arms.

Originally Posted by dilbert firestorm

nah, no need to apologize for taking so long. Fuc'n Dodge!

I understand what Atwater did which is why I did not participate in the Atwater sub-thread. I never said a word about Atwaters actions until now. He did what he did to help his candidate win and he apologized for it. I didn't think his apology was necessary given that it was a campaign strategy and anyone's fair game in that situation. Agreed.

COG was commenting that AP was state controlled media, and I commented that he left out Reuters as the other media outfit. Yes, I was being flippant with the mention of Reuters.

COG was changing the subject , all he could do was shoot the messanger as the facts were not in his corner.

[Munchmasterman]

Originally Posted by I B Hankering

That would be "Sea Stallions".

You're right. It was an election year, and there's always money to influence the voters in an election year. But were they trained? No.

Task Force Commander Major General James B. Vaught: "What's the risk, Colonel Beckwith?"



Beckwith: "Oh, about 99.9 percent."



Vaught: "What's the probability of success?"



Beckwith: "Zero."



Vaught: "Well, we can't do it."



Beckwith: "You're right, Boss."



Vaught: "I've got to buy time from the JCS."



In his book Delta Force, Beckwith details the immense difficulties associated with the rescue mission. Intelligence was poor in Iran, and "it had always been assumed that when Delta was needed overseas, the country in which it would operate would be friendly or at least neutral."19 As the Air Force did not then have a special operations aircraft capability,This means there were no Air Force spec-ops helos not that they couldn't fly them. They had over 100 pilots qualed on the H-53 the pilots for the mission had been drawn from the Marine Corps and trained in time for the aggressive flying style which, though the mission demanded it, was unfamiliar to them [the same pilots Beckwith and Kyle later faulted for "lacking resolve" - not enough training]. "Lacking resolve" is like "Will to combat" and is a mental state. Training doesn't cure or fix either. Experience does. That's where terms like "seasoned" or "blooded" come from. Someone who turns back doesn't say "Fuck it. I haven't been trained for this".The contradiction between the optimism of the flag-rank staff officers and the pessimism of field commanders like Beckwith indicates that the feedback of ground commanders had not been taken seriously by a civilian administration which was determined to execute what it perceived as a last resort.



http://www.mindef.gov.sg/safti/point.../Vol28_2/5.htm

From the same link.

In this instance, because two more than the required number of helicopters had been procured for the mission, an overall lack of complete pilot resolve might lead each individual to compromise his performance by thinking, "It wouldn't matter if I screwed this up, there would be the other seven to carry on." This accusation of inadequate pilot motivation is echoed by the on-scene air commander Colonel James Kyle who blames the pilot of Helo Number Five for the mission's abortion.

The word "Training" is not used by either commander in reference to the performance of helo pilot 5. If they had meant training, they would have said trainiong. They wouldn't beat around the bush.

[JD Barleycorn]

I don't think you can count out the opinion of the American people when it comes to the Iranian hostage release. Remember the jokes? What is big and flat and made of glass? Iran, the day after Reagan takes office. You may not understand but the people in other countries do hear these jokes and comments. Under Carter people were asleep, then angry, then they chafed under Iranian comments. The Iranians knew the American people wanted some payback, some really big payback. Giving the hostages back was the only way to postpone some kind of strike by the US.

[I B Hankering]

Originally Posted by Munchmasterman

The word "Training" is not used by either commander in reference to the performance of helo pilot 5. If they had meant training, they would have said trainiong. They wouldn't beat around the bush.

Training does one of two things: it prepares the individual to act with sureness while simultaneously integrating individuals into the unit for unit operational cohesiveness. Or, it reveals the ineptness of the individual and that individual is washed out. Kyle and Beckwith both faulted the pilots as being the weak-link in the operation. Ineptness reflects poor and inadequate training.

[WTF]

Originally Posted by JD Barleycorn

I don't think you can count out the opinion of the American people when it comes to the Iranian hostage release. Remember the jokes? What is big and flat and made of glass? Iran, the day after Reagan takes office. You may not understand but the people in other countries do hear these jokes and comments. Under Carter people were asleep, then angry, then they chafed under Iranian comments. The Iranians knew the American people wanted some payback, some really big payback. Giving the hostages back was the only way to postpone some kind of strike by the US.

Reagan paid them back alright.

He sold them arms!

Realpolitik. Maybe I B should help you understand this word.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011...rter-interview

What could the US do? How could it save the hostages? It was a question that President Carter wrestled with for 444 long days. It paralysed the presidency. Carter refused to campaign for re-election, refused to light the White House Christmas tree, refused to bomb Tehran.
Rosalynn has been quoted as saying that, had her husband bombed Tehran, he would have been re-elected. I put this to Carter. "That's probably true. A lot of people thought that. But it would probably have resulted in the death of maybe tens of thousands of Iranians who were innocent, and in the deaths of the hostages as well. In retrospect I don't have any doubt that I did the right thing. But it was not a popular thing among the public, and it was not even popular among my own advisers inside the White House. Including my wife."
Really?
"Well, she thought I ought to be more willing to use military power."

[WTF]

One last ting to all the numb nuts that think Obama should get no credit for sending folks in to kill Osama. It cost Jimmy Carter his job. Obama sent in folks to another country.....without telling that country. So many things could have gone wrong.

Just think of Canada doing this on our border. The fallout could be huge.

[Munchmasterman]

Originally Posted by I B Hankering

Training does one of two things: it prepares the individual to act with sureness while simultaneously integrating individuals into the unit for unit operational cohesiveness. Or, it reveals the ineptness of the individual and that individual is washed out. Kyle and Beckwith both faulted the pilots as being the weak-link in the operation. Ineptness reflects poor and inadequate training.

You are right. The inept are washed out. None of the pilots were inept. Ineptness means no aptitude. Training does not increase aptitude. It enhances it.

In the case of piloting an aircraft, the vast majority of the training deals with an individual’s skill at dealing with the large number of things that can occur during flight. Some things can only be simulated. Like flying in a sandstorm. But the pilot’s ability to fly in the storm was not questioned.
Bottom line is you can continue to use words to describe the problem that were not said by Kyle or Beckwith. Training is an attempt to prepare people for the expected issues that can arise in the area for which the training covers. Poor judgment can occur in the best trained pilot in any number of situations. A pilot who survives an act of poor judgment is then experienced as well as trained in that situation. Neither men faulted training for pilot 5. They said what they said. They didn’t mean something else.
Is this that important to you to tie poor training due to budget cuts to this mission? Budget cuts that didn’t occur? Or the degree of training was not germane to the root cause of having to abort the mission?

[Munchmasterman]

Originally Posted by JD Barleycorn

I don't think you can count out the opinion of the American people when it comes to the Iranian hostage release. Remember the jokes? What is big and flat and made of glass? Iran, the day after Reagan takes office. You may not understand but the people in other countries do hear these jokes and comments. Under Carter people were asleep, then angry, then they chafed under Iranian comments. The Iranians knew the American people wanted some payback, some really big payback. Giving the hostages back was the only way to postpone some kind of strike by the US.

And the Iranian attitude was the same then as it is now with our carriers in the area.

Bring it on.

Can they beat us? Depends on the definition of "beat". Could they sink a carrier? Hard to say but they could certainly damage it enough to turn it into a parking lot.

[I B Hankering]

Originally Posted by Munchmasterman

They said what they said.

. . . . overall lack of complete pilot resolve might lead each individual to compromise his performance by thinking, "It wouldn't matter if I screwed this up, there would be the other seven to carry on." [This does not the reflect the mindset of a truly trained and integrated team member] This accusation of inadequate pilot motivation is echoed by the on-scene air commander Colonel James Kyle who blames the pilot of Helo Number Five for the mission's abortion. . . .


. . . . there a lack of pilot resolve in the decision to reverse the course of Helo Number Five? This was the most controversial issue to come out of post-mortem analyses. Secondly, if it had been decided ex ante to proceed with no less than six helicopters, why did the administration later consider
proceeding with five? Was there a breakdown in decision-making discipline?


. . . . the pilots for the mission had been drawn from the Marine Corps and trained in time for the aggressive flying style which, though the mission demanded it, was unfamiliar to them. . . .

Beckwith was reputed to have blamed the pilots for the failure of the mission. His account, admittedly riddled with the fallible wisdom of perfect hindsight, describes the mental shakiness he had observed in some of the pilots. . . .

A helicopter pilot appears to have failed his duty but then he had been "flying in a bowl of milk".


http://www.mindef.gov.sg/safti/point.../Vol28_2/5.htm


++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ +++++++++++++++++++++++

. . . . Carter had met the takeover in Iran with tremendous restraint, equating the national interest with the well-being of the fifty-three hostages, and his measured response had elicited a great deal of admiration, both at home and abroad. His approval ratings had doubled in the first month of the crisis. But in the following months, restraint had begun to smell like weakness and indecision. Three times in the past five months, carefully negotiated secret settlements had been ditched by the inscrutable Iranian mullahs, and the administration had been made to look more foolish each time. Approval ratings had nose-dived, and even stalwart friends of the administration were demanding action. Jimmy Carter’s formidable patience was badly strained. . . .

. . . . It was precisely what he had feared: these pilots were determined to scuttle his mission. It had not been lost on the other commanders, most of whom outranked Beckwith, that the pugnacious colonel regarded them all as inferiors, as supporting players. The pilots, the navigators, the air crews, the fuel-equipment operators, the Rangers, the combat controllers, the spies in Tehran, even the generals back at Wadi Kena—they were all ordinary mortals, squires, spear carriers, water boys. Their job was to serve Delta, to get the colonel and his magnificent men into place for their rendezvous with destiny. All along, Beckwith had been impatient with and suspicious of the other services and units involved; in his eyes, they all lacked experience, nerve, and skill. So now, when things began to go sour, Beckwith felt not just disappointment and anger but contempt. . . .

. . . . Beckwith didn’t see mechanical problems with the helicopters; he saw faltering courage in the men who flew them. He said as much to Kyle, grumbling that the pilots were looking for excuses not to go. . . .

. . . . America’s elite rescue force had lost eight men, seven helicopters, and a C-130, and had not even made contact with the enemy. It was a debacle. It defined the word “debacle.

Hamilton Jordan ducked into the president’s bathroom and vomited.

http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/...ngle_page=true

[CuteOldGuy]

Originally Posted by Munchmasterman

And the Iranian attitude was the same then as it is now with our carriers in the area.

Bring it on.

Can they beat us? Depends on the definition of "beat". Could they sink a carrier? Hard to say but they could certainly damage it enough to turn it into a parking lot.

Can they beat us? No, no way in hell.

Will we let them beat us? Eventually

Will we let them drag us into a long conflict where we refuse to fight hard enough to win because the defense contractors want long term contracts? BINGO!

[Munchmasterman]

Originally Posted by I B Hankering

Carter is responsible. His disregard for all things military - as reflected in his anemic military budget - helped insure that there weren't properly trained helicopter pilots to conduct such a mission.

Military spending decreased every year from 1969 to 1976. In 1977 spending started to increase until 1986. It stayed steady until 1989. From 1990 until 2002 it mostly went down. It spiked up again in 2003.

The mission failure was caused by a brutal sandstorm, radio silence, and equipment failures related to the sandstorm. It was not Carter’s fault in any way except by virtue of him being President.

If anyone had blame it would be the planners. They sent a force that was too small. 8 started out. 2 aborted on the way to the rendezvous with the C-130s, and 1 had its primary hydraulics system fail at the site. With 6 aircraft as a mission minimum, the rescue was aborted. In my previous post I should have made it clear that the accident happened after the mission had been aborted.

The military’s pilots who were involved in the mission and the accident were the best trained we had. All had many, many years of experience and almost certainly were Viet Nam veterans. Why do I say that? Because that’s who you send on a mission like that.

Like with Obama, there are enough real issues with Carter. This was a case of bad luck, not a bad president.

[quote=I B Hankering;2002957]Defense Budget (in billions)
1975 $293.3 Ford (fall of Saigon on 30 April)
1976 $283.8 Ford
1977 $286.2 Carter
1978 $286.5 Carter
1979 $295.6 Carter (the Iran Hostage Crisis begins November 4)
1980 $303.4 Carter (failed Operation Eagle Claw: April 24-25)
1981 $317.4 Reagan Wrong.

The Marines piloting the RH-53D Sea Stallions were not fully integrated and trained to operate with Delta Force, but they were employed because no Army pilots were trained to operate the Sea Stallions - the only helicopter with the range to accomplish the mission (Bowden's Guests of the Ayatollah).There were over 100 Air Force pilots that were qualified in the HH-53B/C, The "Jolly Green Giants".

Training operations during the Carter years were seriously curtailed because of budgetary constraints, and equipment deadline rates soared because there was no money for repair parts. I was there; I remember it well. So was I. 335th Assault Helicopter, The "Cowboys" at Ft. Riley until Oct. 77. We had one hangar queen that was used as a FOD example. We never had more than a couple of birds on the deadline at once and they were there only a few days. We trained a lot due to our support of different units whose aviation units were assigned to different posts. [/quote]

Like I said, Carter increased defense spending each year.

1968 $449.3
1969 438.1
1970 406.3
1971 370.6
1972 343.8
1973 313.3
1974 299.7
1975 293.3
1976 283.8
1977 286.2 Ford The 1977 fiscal year starts in Oct. 1976
1978 286.5 Carter
1979 $295.6 Carter
1980 303.4 Carter
1981 317.4 Carter The 1981 fiscal year starts in Oct. 1980

This failure was caused by a lack of the correct training and the failure to have enough rehearsals


"A six-member commission was appointed by the JCS to study the operation. Headed by Adm James L. Holloway III, the panel included Gen LeRoy Manor, who commanded the Son Tay raid, November 21, 1970 in Vietnam to rescue prisoners. One issue investigated was selection of aircrew. Navy and Marine pilots with little experience in long-range overland navigation or refueling from C-130s were selected though more than a hundred qualified Air Force H-53 pilots were available. Another issue was the lack of a comprehensive readiness evaluation and mission rehearsal program. From the beginning, training was not conducted in a truly joint manner; it was compartmented and held at scattered locations throughout the US. The limited rehearsals that were conducted assessed only portions of the total mission. Also at issue was the number of helicopters used. The commission concluded that at least ten and perhaps as many as twelve helicopters should have been launched to guarantee the minimum of six required for completion of the mission. The plan was also criticized for using the "hopscotch" method of ground refueling instead of air refueling as was used for the Son Tay raid. By air refueling en route, the commission thought the entire Desert One scenario could have been avoided."

"This accusation of inadequate pilot motivation is echoed by the on-scene air commander Colonel James Kyle who blames the pilot of Helo Number Five for aborting the mission."

Kyle, Col. (Ret.) James H., and John Robert Eidson. The Guts to Try: The Untold Story of the Iran Hostage Rescue Mission By the On-Scene Desert Commander, (New York: Orion Books, 1990).

"Beckwith was reputed to have blamed the pilots for the failure of the mission. His account, admittedly riddled with the fallible wisdom of perfect hindsight, describes the mental shakiness he had observed in some of the pilots. Furthermore, when a helicopter had collided with a C-130 fixed-wing plane and exploded during the withdrawal from the scene (after the mission had been aborted), the helicopter pilots had abandoned their helicopters and left the aircraft there (containing money, maps, documents and so on) without taking time to destroy their aircraft and hence maintain security. Beckwith had called them "cowards"."

Beckwith, Colonel (Ret.) Charlie, and Donald Knox, Delta Force (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1983).


Like I said before.

Other than being President, Carter was not to blame.

Originally Posted by I B Hankering

Yeah, that about sums it up.

It was pilot error (attributable to lack of trainingYour opinion) that caused the crash. The pilot didn't hold his position and allowed his hoovering helicopter to drift into the stationary C-130 fuel plane.

It was dark and in the middle of a dust storm, agravated by rotor wash.

Originally Posted by I B Hankering

Training and unit cohesion - both of which were impacted negatively by funding.

Your opinion. Funding is not mentioned by any of the principals.

Originally Posted by I B Hankering

Other than the budget corrections to Fiscal Year rather than Calendar Year, you've repeated my argument almost verbatim. Bowden includes Kyle and Beckwith's remarks - alluded to in post #204 (saw no need to degrade the USMC) - in his book.

WTF, the remarks in Munch's citations above are not included in the wiki article.

Again, the Delta Force was not trained to fly Sea Stallions. The Marine pilots were not trained and integrated to work with Delta Force. Training and readiness is governed by budget. It was Carter's budget. Violá!



Munch's argument is my argument; hence, you are agreeing with me!

Wrong. You continue to bring up a lack of funding and training. Funding is not mentioned by any of the reports. Proscribed training is governed by budget. Training lapses or unknown needs are not.
This didn't happen because Delta didn't fly Sea Stallions or that Marines weren't trained to work with Delta. These were mechanical failures. After those failures there were not enough helicopters.
This didn't happen because money for training wasn't available. The Holloway report detailed training, training that was not considered necessary, that would be added to the skill set needed by future pilots. The whole report was about identifying and fixing the things that screwed up the mission.

It happened because the training didn't cover all the subjects it needed to. You continually say training was inadequate due to lack of funds. The Holloway report makes no mention of that issue.

Originally Posted by I B Hankering

You cite both Kyle and Beckwith, and then ignore their input.

First off, they say nothing about budgets or lay fault on Carter.
Second, they place the blame on the pilots. They don't fault the training. They fault the pilots for not following it.
You are saying they didn't destroy their aircraft and all of the intelligence materials, because there was no money to practice destroying their aircraft.
Col. Kyle said the pilot of helo 5, who returned to the carrier, was the cause of the aborted mission.

By citing them, I acknowledge their input.

You ignore them by continuing to blame Carter.

You know who didn't ignore them? The man who insisted on 2 extra helicopters flying into Pakistan to do bin Laden. So when 1 of 2 helicopters crashed in bin Laden's compound, instead of trying to fit 25 people and a body on 1 Black hawk or waiting on a helicopter from Afghanistan to show up, everybody got out alive. Oh, except bin Laden.

So the guy who insisted said more than a simple "yes". The guy who insisted remembered what happened at eagle claw and corrected it. The guy who insisted had a big hand in saving SEAL Team 6's ass. The guy who insisted earned his credit.

Regardless of what someone who blames Carter says.

Originally Posted by I B Hankering

Beckwith blamed the pilots for the failure of the mission. The on-scene air commander Colonel James Kyle blamed the pilot of Helo Number Five who 'decided' to turn back for killing the mission. Kyle blames the pilot of Helo Number Five for lacking the resolve to continue with the mission as he should have. That is a reflection of inadequate training.

I think it is a character issue. Moot point. You say the inadequacies come from a lack of training funds. They also come from not recognizing the need for that training. You are beating a dead horse. They don't say that or indicate that a lack of funds had anything to do with this. And no statements or proof to the contrary
The spending increased every year, you babble about fiscal vs. calendar year (the budget is fiscal year, you know that), and everything you say now tries to prove it was money.

Give it up.

Originally Posted by I B Hankering

That would be "Sea Stallions".

You're right. It was an election year, and there's always money to influence the voters in an election year. But were they trained? No.

Task Force Commander Major General James B. Vaught: "What's the risk, Colonel Beckwith?"



Beckwith: "Oh, about 99.9 percent."



Vaught: "What's the probability of success?"



Beckwith: "Zero."



Vaught: "Well, we can't do it."



Beckwith: "You're right, Boss."



Vaught: "I've got to buy time from the JCS."



In his book Delta Force, Beckwith details the immense difficulties associated with the rescue mission. Intelligence was poor in Iran, and "it had always been assumed that when Delta was needed overseas, the country in which it would operate would be friendly or at least neutral."19 As the Air Force did not then have a special operations aircraft capability,This means there were no Air Force spec-ops helos not that they couldn't fly them. They had over 100 pilots qualed on the H-53 the pilots for the mission had been drawn from the Marine Corps and trained in time for the aggressive flying style which, though the mission demanded it, was unfamiliar to them [the same pilots Beckwith and Kyle later faulted for "lacking resolve" - not enough training]. "Lacking resolve" is like "Will to combat" and is a mental state. Training doesn't cure or fix either. Experience does. That's where terms like "seasoned" or "blooded" come from. Someone who turns back doesn't say "Fuck it. I haven't been trained for this".The contradiction between the optimism of the flag-rank staff officers and the pessimism of field commanders like Beckwith indicates that the feedback of ground commanders had not been taken seriously by a civilian administration which was determined to execute what it perceived as a last resort.

which was determined to execute what it perceived as a last resort.



http://www.mindef.gov.sg/safti/point.../Vol28_2/5.htm

From the same link.

In this instance, because two more than the required number of helicopters had been procured for the mission, an overall lack of complete pilot resolve might lead each individual to compromise his performance by thinking, "It wouldn't matter if I screwed this up, there would be the other seven to carry on." This accusation of inadequate pilot motivation is echoed by the on-scene air commander Colonel James Kyle who blames the pilot of Helo Number Five for the mission's abortion.

The word "Training" is not used by either commander in reference to the performance of helo pilot 5. If they had meant training, they would have said trainiong. They wouldn't beat around the bush.

Originally Posted by I B Hankering

Training does one of two things: it prepares the individual to act with sureness while simultaneously integrating individuals into the unit for unit operational cohesiveness. Or, it reveals the ineptness of the individual and that individual is washed out. Kyle and Beckwith both faulted the pilots as being the weak-link in the operation. Ineptness reflects poor and inadequate training.

You are right. The inept are washed out. None of the pilots were inept. Ineptness means no aptitude. Training does not increase aptitude. It enhances it.

In the case of piloting an aircraft, the vast majority of the training deals with an individual’s skill at dealing with the large number of things that can occur during flight. Some things can only be simulated. Like flying in a sandstorm. But the pilot’s ability to fly in the storm was not questioned.
Bottom line is you can continue to use words to describe the problem that were not said by Kyle or Beckwith. Training is an attempt to prepare people for the expected issues that can arise in the area for which the training covers. Poor judgment can occur in the best trained pilot in any number of situations. A pilot who survives an act of poor judgment is then experienced as well as trained in that situation. Neither men faulted training for pilot 5. They said what they said. They didn’t mean something else.
Is this that important to you to tie poor training due to budget cuts to this mission? Budget cuts that didn’t occur? Or the degree of training was not germane to the root cause of having to abort the mission?

This sums it up so far.

[Munchmasterman]

Originally Posted by I B Hankering

. . . . {overall lack of complete pilot resolve might lead each individual to compromise his performance by thinking, "It wouldn't matter if I screwed this up, there would be the other seven to carry on."} Neither ground commander said this [This does not the reflect the mindset of a truly trained and integrated team member] {Your words, not theirs} This accusation of inadequate pilot motivation is echoed by the on-scene air commander Colonel James Kyle who blames the pilot of Helo Number Five for the mission's abortion. . . .


. . . . there a lack of pilot resolve in the decision to reverse the course of Helo Number Five? This was the most controversial issue to come out of post-mortem analyses. Secondly, if it had been decided ex ante to proceed with no less than six helicopters, why did the administration later consider
proceeding with five? Was there a breakdown in decision-making discipline?


. . . . the pilots for the mission had been drawn from the Marine Corps and trained in time for the aggressive flying style which, though the mission demanded it, was unfamiliar to them. . . .Should have gone with Air Force pilots who were known for their ground fire avoidance shown during downed pilot rescues

Beckwith was reputed to have blamed the pilots for the failure of the mission. His account, admittedly riddled with the fallible wisdom of perfect hindsight, describes the mental shakiness he had observed in some of the pilots. . . . Supported by the failure to destroy their aircraft.

A helicopter pilot appears to have failed his duty but then he had been "flying in a bowl of milk". He was on the correct course and about 100 miles from Desert One when he reversed course.


http://www.mindef.gov.sg/safti/point.../Vol28_2/5.htm


++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ +++++++++++++++++++++++

. . . . Carter had met the takeover in Iran with tremendous restraint, equating the national interest with the well-being of the fifty-three hostages, and his measured response had elicited a great deal of admiration, both at home and abroad. His approval ratings had doubled in the first month of the crisis. But in the following months, restraint had begun to smell like weakness and indecision. To a certain kind of person. The kind that has no responsibility for his actions in the situation.Three times in the past five months, carefully negotiated secret settlements had been ditched by the inscrutable Iranian mullahs, and the administration had been made to look more foolish each time. To someone that thinks getting 19 of the hostages back is good enough. Approval ratings had nose-dived, and even stalwart friends of the administration were demanding action. Jimmy Carter’s formidable patience was badly strained. . . .

. . . . It was precisely what he had feared: these pilots were determined to scuttle his mission. It had not been lost on the other commanders, most of whom outranked Beckwith, that the pugnacious colonel regarded them all as inferiors, as supporting players. A common, though usually unspoken, attitude of the "A" team. The pilots, the navigators, the air crews, the fuel-equipment operators, the Rangers, the combat controllers, the spies in Tehran, even the generals back at Wadi Kena—they were all ordinary mortals, squires, spear carriers, water boys. The "B" Team Their job was to serve Delta, to get the colonel and his magnificent men into place for their rendezvous with destiny. A common attitude felt by the "B" team All along, Beckwith had been impatient with and suspicious of the other services and units involved; in his eyes, they all lacked experience, nerve, and skill. An example of this is a F-15 pilot and his ground crew although he knows their value to the overall team. They are there to keep him in the air. Typically the above sentiments expressed by the author are not vocallized. Egos swell with rank. This is common knowledge.So now, when things began to go sour, Beckwith felt not just disappointment and anger but contempt.Authors opinion of the feelings of the Col. . . .

. . . . Beckwith didn’t see mechanical problems with the helicopters; he saw faltering courage in the men who flew them. He said as much to Kyle, grumbling that the pilots were looking for excuses not to go. . . .Only one of the helos that Beckwith saw had mechanical problems. While I do not agree the pilots were looking for excuses, they were on the ground, totally out of their element, and the mission was coming apart. Faltering courage is a human reaction to similar cirrcumstances. The test is whether they still perform while scared. It is unlikely any were "cowards".

. . . . America’s elite rescue force had lost eight men, seven helicopters, and a C-130, and had not even made contact with the enemy. It was a debacle. It defined the word “debacle. Supporting evidence that the 5 surviving helicopter crews at Desert 1 were inexperienced and too rattled to execute their training that dictated destroying their choppers before leaving. It is the pilot's responsebility to ensure the destruction of his aircraft.

Hamilton Jordan ducked into the president’s bathroom and vomited.

http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/...ngle_page=true

What happened to your original, but incorrect, claims of lack of budget and training?

[I B Hankering]

Originally Posted by Munchmasterman

What happened to your original, but incorrect, claims of lack of budget and training?

It never changed. One outcome from the Operation Eagle Claw debacle is that helicopter pilots are now organic to the Delta Force TOE: they are funded and trained to mission standard. Since there were no Delta Force pilots at the time of the rescue, untrained USMC pilots were drafted for the mission. Throughout rehearsals, Beckwith and Kyle were not impressed with the pilots’ skills (reread the above), and they doubted the pilots’ abilities to carry out the mission (reread the above). Beckwith and Kyle subsequently blamed these USMC pilots (plural: not singular - reread the above) for the mission’s failure because they demonstrated they were not equal to the task. As stated above, Beckwith believed “they all lacked experience, nerve, and skill” which is synonymous with saying they were not trained. It's in black and white, but you refuse to acknowledge it.

Furthermore, your insistence that the Air Force had better trained pilots is ridiculous. How many stereotypical, pansy-assed Air Force pilots ever lifted-off or landed on an aircraft carrier? Air Force pilots are/were even less qualified, less trained, to meet the requirements of the mission than USMC pilots. The subsequent change in Delta Force’s TOE is a reflection of lessons learned from the mission. Delta Force needed pilots trained to mission standard to be effective.

At the time of Operation Eagle Claw, trained pilots were not allocated or available: they were not funded.