Several Federal Open Market Committee Members Concerned About Risks Of Further Asset Buys

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Several Members Say Should Be Prepared To Vary QE3 Pace

WASHINGTON (MNI) - Several senior Federal Reserve officials believe the central bank should be prepared to adjust the rate of its aggressive bond buying based on changes in the economic outlook, or its continuing assessment of the impact and costs of such large scale asset purchases, the minutes of from January Federal Open Market Committee meeting showed Wednesday.

The minutes from the gathering of the Fed's policy-setting group also showed that "a number of participants" voiced their concern that thought the economy's growth of potential output had been reduced in recent years, possibly in part due to tight credit conditions and weak economic activity following the 2008 financial crisis.

The subject of the open-ended program buying $85 billion a month in Treasury and mortgage-backed securities underlined the division among Fed officials regarding the future of the Fed's efforts via quantitative easing to aid the recovery.

The minutes noted that "Most participants commented that the Committee's asset purchases had been effective in easing financial conditions and helping stimulate economic activity, and many pointed, in particular, to the support that low longer-term interest rates had provided to housing or consumer durable purchases."

However, "many participants also expressed some concerns about potential costs and risks arising from further asset purchases," it added.

As a result, "several participants emphasized that the Committee should be prepared to vary the pace of asset purchases, either in response to changes in the economic outlook or as its evaluation of the efficacy and costs of such purchases evolved," it added.

But while "a number of participants" said an ongoing evaluation of the efficacy, costs, and risks of asset purchases might cause the Committee to taper or end its purchases before there was a substantial improvement in the labor market outlook, "several others" countered that just as significant are the potential costs of reducing or ending asset purchases too soon, or that asset purchases should continue until a substantial improvement in the labor market outlook had occurred.

Below are full excerpts from the FOMC minutes:

The Committee again discussed the possible benefits and costs of additional asset purchases. Most participants commented that the Committee's asset purchases had been effective in easing financial conditions and helping stimulate economic activity, and many pointed, in particular, to the support that low longer-term interest rates had provided to housing or consumer durable purchases.

In addition, the Committee's highly accommodative policy was seen as helping keep inflation over the medium term closer to its longer-run goal of 2 percent than would otherwise have been the case. Policy was also aimed at improving the labor market outlook. In this regard, several participants stressed the economic and social costs of high unemployment, as well as the potential for negative effects on the economy's longer-term path of a prolonged period of underutilization of resources.

However, many participants also expressed some concerns about potential costs and risks arising from further asset purchases. Several participants discussed the possible complications that additional purchases could cause for the eventual withdrawal of policy accommodation, a few mentioned the prospect of inflationary risks, and some noted that further asset purchases could foster market behavior that could undermine financial stability.

Several participants noted that a very large portfolio of long-duration assets would, under certain circumstances, expose the Federal Reserve to significant capital losses when these holdings were unwound, but others pointed to offsetting factors and one noted that losses would not impede the effective operation of monetary policy.

A few also raised concerns about the potential effects of further asset purchases on the functioning of particular financial markets, although a couple of other participants noted that there had been little evidence to date of such effects. In light of this discussion, the staff was asked for additional analysis ahead of future meetings to support the Committee's ongoing assessment of the asset purchase program.

Several participants emphasized that the Committee should be prepared to vary the pace of asset purchases, either in response to changes in the economic outlook or as its evaluation of the efficacy and costs of such purchases evolved. For example, one participant argued that purchases should vary incrementally from meeting to meeting in response to incoming information about the economy. A number of participants stated that an ongoing evaluation of the efficacy, costs, and risks of asset purchases might well lead the Committee to taper or end its purchases before it judged that a substantial improvement in the outlook for the labor market had occurred.

Several others argued that the potential costs of reducing or ending asset purchases too soon were also significant, or that asset purchases should continue until a substantial improvement in the labor market outlook had occurred. A few participants noted examples of past instances in which policymakers had prematurely removed accommodation, with adverse effects on economic growth, employment, and price stability; they also stressed the importance of communicating the Committee's commitment to maintaining a highly accommodative stance of policy as long as warranted by economic conditions. In this regard, a number of participants discussed the possibility of providing monetary accommodation by holding securities for a longer period than envisioned in the Committee's exit principles, either as a supplement to, or a replacement for, asset purchases.

Participants also discussed the economic thresholds in the Committee's forward guidance on the path of the federal funds rate. On the whole, participants judged that financial markets had adapted to the shift from date-based communication to guidance based on economic thresholds without difficulty, although a few participants stated that communications challenges remained.

For example, one participant commented that some market participants appeared to have incorrectly interpreted the thresholds as triggers that, when reached, would necessarily lead to an immediate rise in the federal funds rate. A couple of participants noted that this policy tool would be more effective if the Committee were able to communicate a consensus expectation for the path of the federal funds rate after a threshold was crossed. One participant also indicated a preference for lowering the threshold for the unemployment rate as a means of providing additional accommodation.

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Participants also touched on the implications for monetary policy of changes in estimates of the economy's potential output. A number of participants thought that the growth of potential output had been reduced in recent years, possibly in part because restrictive financial conditions and weak economic activity in the aftermath of the financial crisis had reduced investment, business formation, and the pace of adoption of new technologies. Many of these participants worried that, should the economy continue to operate below potential for too long, reduced investment and underutilization of labor could further undermine the growth of potential output over time. A couple of participants noted that uncertainties concerning both the level of, and the source of shifts in, potential output made it difficult to base decisions about monetary policy on real-time measures of the output gap.